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Article
Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging
Workers: The 1990s Version of Age
and Pension Discrimination in
Employment
by
GARY MINDA*
In this Article, I am interested in exploring how an otherwise for-
bidden version of age and pension discrimination in employment can
be practiced by firms which have implemented downsizing' or reduc-
tion-in-force (RIF)2 strategies. My goal will be to explain how this
form of discrimination can be perpetuated in the name of cost con-
tainment policies. I will refer to this type of illegal age discrimination
as "opportunistic downsizing." Downsizing is "opportunistic" when-
* William J. Maier Jr. Visiting Professor of Law, West Virginia University College
of Law. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article was financed by Brooklyn
Law School's Summer Research program.
1. The word "downsize" first appeared during the oil crisis of the early 1970s, when
automobile executives used "downsizing" to describe the move toward the design of
smaller, gas-efficient automobiles. See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battle-
fields of Business, Millions of Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al, A14. When
applied to workers, the word "downsize" has come to signify reduced expectations and
reduced employment opportunity. In the labor relations offices of corporate America,
downsizing has become a euphemism to soften the hard edge of words like "fired," "dis-
missed," and "laid off." In the corporate-speak of the 1990s, employees "are 'downsized,'
'separated,' 'severed,' 'unassigned.' [Employees] are told that their jobs 'are not going
forward."' Id. In board rooms and chief executive officer (CEO) offices of corporate
America, downsizing is a word that summarizes a host of business survival strategies
designed to save the corporation from death in the global market place. For most Ameri-
can workers, the word symbolizes the permanent loss of a career job. In the print media,
the word "downsize" is used to characterize a fundamental transformation in the work-
place; changes which rival those of the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century.
2. RIF has a euphemistic quality similar to downsizing, and has similarly been used
to mean a reduction in the number of employees in a particular employer's work force for
economic reasons. See Lisa Imbrogno, Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It Too? Ratifica-
tion of Releases of ADEA Claims, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L. J. 311, 326 n.104 (1993).
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ever it is implemented to exploit the vulnerable position of a late-
career employee who cannot easily leave the relationship due to fac-
tors such as job-specific training which is not transferable to other po-
tential employers, employment and pension benefits linked to
seniority, and familial and community ties.3 These factors represent
the "sunk costs" of the late-career employee in his/her relationship
with the employer, and make older workers uniquely vulnerable to
unfair treatment by their employers.4
Late-career employees nearing retirement will be especially vul-
nerable since they stand to lose valuable retirement benefits if they
are discharged prior to vesting. The employer, on the other hand, will
have an incentive to downsize expensive late-career employees and
replace them, if possible, with less expensive younger workers who are
many years away from achieving entitlement to valuable employment
and retirement benefits. I will argue that the practice of opportunistic
downsizing unfairly breaches the trust of long-term employees and
should be considered illegal discrimination in employment.
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),S
Congress has attempted to protect older workers who find themselves
"disadvantaged [because of their age] in their efforts to retain employ-
ment and especially to regain employment when displaced from
jobs."' 6 ADEA protects workers over the age of forty from discharges
and other employer actions that are based upon stereotypes associ-
3. I draw from Professor Stewart J. Schwab's discussion of the economics of em-
ployer opportunism in career employment. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Ac-
commodating Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 15-28 (1993).
Professor Schwab's analysis of employer opportunism in career employment develops ar-
guments drawn from the economic study of long term relational contracts. See generally
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. Rav.
1089 (1981).
4. In the absence of detailed enforceable contracts that regulate behavior, parties to
a long-term relationship become vulnerable to opportunism. This will occur whenever one
party to the relationship has incurred "sunk costs" in the relation which render voluntary
termination by that party "costly." In such a case, the non-vulnerable party may have an
economic interest in exploiting the other party's vulnerability by forcing that party to ac-
cept unfavorable terms. Professor Schwab argues that late-career employees face the
greatest danger of opportunistic firings. Schwab, supra note 3, at 43. The reason for this is
that "the general self-interest check on arbitrary firings does not exist; firing such a worker
does not hurt the employer but is instead in its immediate economic interest." Id. at 19.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (stating the legislative purpose of ADEA). The legislative pur-
pose set out by Congress when it enacted ADEA provides:
- The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves
disadvantaged in their efforts to... regain employment when displaced from jobs;
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ated with the age of the worker and motivated by ignorance, vicious-
ness, or irrationality. In recognizing a form of unlawful "ageism,"
which is analogous to, but not the same as sexism or racism,7 Congress
has sought to prohibit forms of employer behavior that have systemat-
ically undervalued the worth of older people in the workplace. 8
A late-career employee nearing retirement may also lose valua-
ble retirement benefits if he or she is terminated before such benefits
vest. Such an employee may allege that downsizing was motivated by
an intent to discriminate in retaliation for the future exercise of rights
under a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).9 Section 510 of ERISA prohibits this
form of discrimination in order to protect pension benefits of ERISA-
regulated plans.' 0 Hence, for those late-career employees who are
terminated prior to the vesting of their pension benefits, there is also
the possibility of a pension discrimination claim under ERISA.11
Opportunistic downsizing is a unique form of disparate treatment
based on age, which conflicts with the congressional purpose underly-
ing both ADEA and ERISA, because older workers are particularly
vulnerable. I will argue that opportunistic downsizing violates ADEA
when the employer's decision to downsize older late-career workers is
motivated by the larger salaries and benefits such workers earn due to
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance
has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may
work to the disadvantage of older persons; ....
Id.
7. According to Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, the legislative justification for
ADEA was based on the view that "people over 40 are subject to a form of prejudice,
'ageism' that is analogous to racism and sexism." RIcHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE 320 (1996).
8. Posner argues that the only plausible basis for the form of prejudice known as
ageism consists "of attributing to all people of a particular age the characteristics of the
average person of that age." POSNER, supra note 7, at 322. See also infra notes 148-61 and
accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
11, 12, 15, 18, 22, 26, 29, 31, 42, and 45 U.S.C.).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). This section makes it unlawful:
For any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan... or for the purpose of inter-
fering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become
entitled under the plan....
Id.
11. As Justice O'Connor has noted, the Supreme Court has never ruled out the possi-
bility of "dual liability under ERISA and ADEA where the decision to fire the employee
was motivated both by the employee's age and by his pension status." Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993).
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seniority. Similarly, I will argue that opportunistic downsizing should
be found to be violative of ERISA whenever the employer's decision
to lay off a late-career employee is motivated by a decision to save
money by preventing his or her pension benefits from vesting.
I will also attempt to explain how anti-discrimination legislation
might better address contemporary problems of age and pension dis-
crimination in the workplace of the 1990s. In doing so, I hope to re-
spond to the criticism of politically conservative legal scholars who
have argued that age discrimination legislation can no longer be justi-
fied in light of legitimate business reasons for the practices that
ADEA rendered illegal. Contrary to those who have argued that
ADEA is "mischievous" or a "misbegotten venture,"'1 2 this Article as-
serts that ADEA's failure is the direct result of judicial interpretations
of statutory restrictions which have failed to respond to the way age
discrimination actually operates in the era of downsizing. What is
needed is not less regulation, but rather, more informed understand-
ing of how age discrimination has been perpetuated by business strat-
egies designed to cut labor costs. Instead of "downsizing" ADEA, as
conservative legal scholars have recently suggested, I will propose new
judicial standards for strengthening the existing provisions of age dis-
crimination law in order to render the law more responsive to the
plight of older workers.
Part I will describe the current plight of older workers who con-
tinue to struggle to survive the wave of "restructuring," "outsourcing,"
and "lean manufacturing" strategies that have led to RIF and down-
sizing in the workplace during the early 1990s.13 In this part, I will
attempt to explain why downsizing/RIF has had the greatest impact
on older workers. Part II then considers the current state of the age
12. POSNER, supra note 7, at 361; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYmENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 444, 448 (1992). Professor Epstein
argues that ADEA is "more mischievous than the anti-discrimination statutes governing
race or sex because it imposes the largest deviation between the contracts that would
emerge in an unregulated competitive market and those that emerge under statutory re-
striction." Id. at 448. Posner has, in turn, accepted Epstein's indictment of ADEA in argu-
ing that ADEA is a "particularly misbegotten venture in tilting at the windmills of ageism
[Posner's term for age discrimination]." POSNER, supra note 7, at 361.
13. I focus on the early 1990s because that is when an enormous wave of downsizings
began in corporate America. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at Al. By the mid-
1990s, there was improvement on the job front. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, The New Jobs:
A Growing Number Are Good Ones, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1996, § 3, at 1 (reporting that
since 1995, the percentage of new jobs that pay above-average wages was double what it
was in 1992, when the nation was just starting to recover from a recession). It remains to
be determined if the early 1990s wave of downsizings has peaked or dissipated. See infra
note 14.
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discrimination law in the context of the downsizings of the early 1990s.
As Part II will show, age discrimination law has become infused with
competitive economic rationales which have largely immunized down-
sizing from age discrimination regulation. Part Ill will then explain
how prevailing judicial attitudes about age discrimination law have
prevented the legal system from responding to the problem of oppor-
tunistic downsizing. In Part IV, I will examine the implications of op-
portunistic downsizing of late-career employees in relation to
ERISA's pension discrimination provision. In Part V, I will argue the
case for bringing opportunistic downsizing within the reach of age and
pension discrimination legislation. Finally, in the conclusion, I will ex-
plore the consequences of what may happen if opportunistic downsiz-
ing is allowed to go unchecked by the law. I conclude that
opportunistic downsizing will contribute to both the pending retire-
ment crisis and will further advance the slow death of the American
work ethic which has heretofore sustained America's standard of
living.
I. Downsizing and the Older Worker
We live in an age of widespread economic uncertainty. No one
disputes that the past two decades have been cruel to many industrial
workers, skilled and unskilled alike.14 Real wages have failed to in-
14. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFrE STUDY: Dis-
PLACED WORKER TRENDS IN THE 1980S AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE (Feb. 1993)
(reporting that "[e]ach year between 1981 and 1990, an average of almost 2 million work-
ers lost full-time jobs and were not recalled by their former employers"). See also Tim
DowNsIziNG OF AmERicA (New York Times ed., 1996); Peter Cappelli, Rethinking Em-
ployment, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 563, 576-80 (1995). Recently in the United States, how-
ever, there has been disagreement concerning the significance to be attached to the
magnitude of corporate downsizing in the economy, and the policy consequences of the
downsizing numbers. Compare, e.g., Simon Head, The New, Ruthless Economy, 43 N.Y.
REv. BooKs, Feb. 29,1996, with Paul Krugman, Down-sizing Downsizing, SLATE, June 24,
1996 (available at: http/www.slate.com/Dismal96-06-24/dismal.asp). Krugman, an econ-
omist at Stanford, in a recent comment on the internet claimed that the April 1996 Report
of the Council of Economic Advisers suggested that "[w]orkers are not doing as badly as
recent headlines might suggest." Krugman, Down-sizing Downsizing, supra. See also John
Cassidy, All Worked Up: Is Downsizing Really News or Is It Just Business as Usual?, NEw
YORKER, Apr. 22, 1996, at 22 (arguing that the New York Tunes report should be taken
"with a grain of salt"). But see infra notes 19-25, 40-44 and accompanying text. See also
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKER DISPLACEMENT DURING
Tfm MrD-1990s (Aug. 22, 1996) (most recent job displacement survey reporting job dis-
placement due to downsizing and layoffs remains high despite drop in unemployment
rates). More recently, the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics has acknowl-
edged that its August 1996 job displacement survey was drawn from a survey with a lower
response rate which should reveal a higher level of job displacement for the 1993-95 pe-
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crease appreciably during the mild economic recovery experienced
between 1990 and 1995.15 Productivity and stock market indices have
shown healthy growth, while median family incomes have remained
stagnant between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, and income ine-
quality has widened between the middle and upper classes of soci-
ety.16 Increases in real wages have failed to keep pace with reported
increases in productivity indicating a decline in the standard of living
for many American workers.17 Growing income inequality has given
rise to serious concerns that American society is itself at risk.18 The
inability of the industrial sector to generate new high paying jobs, cou-
pled with the increasing competitive demands for cutting costs to meet
the "leaner" competitors in the global market place have squeezed
American workers where it hurts the most-jobs and salaries.
A. Downsizing of Aging Workers During the Early 1990s
Department of Labor statistics show that since 1979, forty-three
million jobs were eliminated from the American economy, and sixty-
five percent of those workers who lost their jobs have been forced to
riod. See BLS Correcting Displacement Worker Data, 153 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 283 (Oct.
28, 1996). The August 1996 BLS Job Displacement Survey showed that the number of
long-term U.S. workers who lost their jobs between January 1993 and December 1995 was
still substantial-3.8 million. See BUREAU OF LABOR STA-nSTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NEws-woRKER DISPLACEMENT DURING THE MM-1990S (Aug. 22, 1996).
Simon Head, a correspondent for the Financial Times, writes that despite all the good
news of productivity and job growth, there has been a steady downward trend in the living
standard for most families since the early 1970s. Head, New Ruthless Economy, supra, at
47. Anyone who denies the potential nightmare of downsizing should study Western Eu-
rope today. See John Tagliabue, In Europe, a Wave of Layoffs Stuns White-Collar Workers,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1996, at Al, C1. The unemployment figures in Western Europe are
startling. In France, average unemployment is over 11%; in Germany it is approaching
10%. Ethan B. Kapstein, Workers and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., May/June
1996, at 22. As Ethan B. Kapstein has recently noted:
The Europeans have created a lost generation of workers and are now suffering
for it in terms of increased crime, drug abuse, violence against immigrants, and
the increasing popularity of extremist political groups. In this context, it is sober-
ing to realize that Germany's current level of four million unemployed is the
highest it has been since the early 1930s.
Id. Whether one agrees with optimists such as Krugman, or pessimists such as Head, there
is no serious disagreement that downsizing has affected older workers more than any other
group. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
15. Head, supra note 14, at 47.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Alan Greenspan admonished Congress in July 1995 that the growing income ine-
quality in the United States could become a "major threat to our society." Id.
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accept lower-paying, less-skilled work.'9 A recent, highly-publicized
New York Times "special report" on downsizing revealed that
"[r]oughly 50 percent more people, about 3 million, are affected by
layoffs each year than the 2 million victims of violent crimes (reported
murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults). '20 A February
1996 Newsweek cover story entitled Corporate Killers, in turn, re-
vealed how some of the largest Fortune 500 corporations have re-
cently downsized thousands of workers, while rewarding their CEOs
with enormous salaries.21 The Newsweek story estimates that in the
last five years, 370,000 jobs were eliminated by major corporations
seeking to cut labor costs.2 -
Sensational stories in the media do not necessarily provide evi-
dence of the actual downsizing trends in the economy, since they are
not based on representative sampling and empirical verification.
However, studies of the American economy have confirmed the me-
dia's perception of decreasing job stability caused by downsizing, RIF,
and restructuring. A study conducted by Kenneth A. Swinnerton and
Howard Wial presented empirical evidence of declining job stability in
19. These statistics collected by the Department of Labor's surveys on job displace-
ment of adults age 20 and over, conducted every two years, were consolidated and ana-
lyzed under a moving-average technique by the New York Times. Uchitelle & Kleinfield,
supra note 1, at A15. See also BUREAU OF LABOR STAMS&ICS. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NEWS--WORKER DisPLAcEmENT DURING =E MID-1990S (Aug. 22,1996). The Labor De-
partment statistics estimated that 36 million jobs had been eliminated between 1979 and
1993, but the New York Tunes analysis, compensating for recall accuracy, overlapping
surveys and projections based on past trends and annual figures of unemployment and the
labor force, put the number at 43 million through 1995. Id.
20. Uchitelle & Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at A1. The New York Times reports in graphic
detail why many women, minorities, and older Americans, the groups most affected by
downsizing, have lost ground financially and are rightfully fearful of the future. Id. at 34.
21. See Allan Sloan, Corporate Killers: Wall Street Loves Layoffs, But the Public Is
Scared as Hell Is There a Better Way?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 44.
22. See id. Sloan reveals how CEOs earning record salaries with some of the largest
corporations in America, have downsized thousands of jobs. For example, Michael Miles,
former CEO of Philip Morris earned a salary of $1,000,000 at the time his corporation
downsized 14,000 jobs; Frank Shrontz, CEO of Boeing earned a salary of $1,420,935 at the
time his corporation downsized 28,000 jobs; and William Ferguson, former CEO of Nynex
earned a salary of $800,000 at the time his corporation downsized 16,800 jobs. Id. at 47.
Not everyone finds these statistics to be especially alarming. For example, Paul Krugman,
an economics professor at Stanford, has reported in his monthly Web column, The Dismal
Scientist, that "the impact of corporate downsizing has been greatly exaggerated." See
Krugman, supra note 14. Krugman states that the 370,000 lost jobs reported in the News-
week article, Sloan, supra note 21, at 44, is but "a tiny blip in the number of workers who
lose or change jobs every year, even in the healthiest economy." Id. This equaninimous
view offers cold comfort to those 370,000 "downsized" employees who lost their livelihood.
the U.S. economy since the late 1980s.23 In their study, Swinnerton
and Wial concluded that "if the pattern of the late 1980s persists,
workers who have stable, long-term jobs will make up an increasingly
exclusive club."'24 More recently, a consulting firm estimated that
based on the announced layoffs published in the media, 131,209 work-
ers would be laid off in the first quarter of 1996.25 While these studies
may not be conclusive, they do provide support for the views ex-
pressed in the media.
Although downsizing may not affect all workers, older workers as
a group are particularly vulnerable. The job displacement rates for
older workers are higher than average, considering the length of time
between jobs as well as the wage loss due to unemployment. Accord-
ing to the April 1996 Report of the Council of Economic Advisers and
U.S. Department of Labor, the displacement rates for older white-
collar and better-educated workers has increased.26 This change in
the incidence of job displacement for older white-collar workers is
probably the chief reason for the heightened anxiety about job loss
reported in the media.
For older workers, anxiety about job loss has a real factual basis.
According to a study by Ann Huff Stevens of Rutgers University and
the National Bureau of Economic Research, wage loss resulting from
displacement is persistent even after reemployment at another job.27
Stevens states that "[s]ix or more years after displacement, a displaced
worker's earnings remain roughly 10 percent below what they [sic]
could have otherwise expected to earn." Moreover, she notes that
"[r]oughly a quarter of those displaced during 1991 and 1992 had
either stopped searching for work or had not yet found work by the
23. Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S.
Economy?, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 293 (1996).
24. Id. at 304. These results, however have been contested by other economists. See
Francis X. Diebold et al., Comment on Kenneth A. Swinnerton and Howard Wia4 "Is Job
Stability Declining in the U.S. Economy?," 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 348 (1996). Swin-
nerton and Wial have shown that these criticisms are incorrect in a subsequent reply com-
ment. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S.
Economy? Reply to Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 352
(1996).
25. See U.S. Growth Slowing; '95 Productivity Up a Mere 1.1%, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Mar. 7, 1996, at 1D (the consulting firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas conducted
the survey).
26. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, JOB CREATION
AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES: TmE UNITED STATES LABOR MARKET, 1 (Apr. 1996)
[hereinafter REPORT].
27. See id. (reporting the Stevens study).
28. Id.
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time they were surveyed in February, 1994."29 The cost of losing a job
in today's economy is thus both significant and persistent for older
workers who have a higher displacement rate. For many of these
older displaced workers, a good job with promise of long-term job
security is a thing of the past.
It is true that the most recent economic data on jobs and wages
have shown some signs of improvement, but it is far from clear what
this may mean for older workers who have been downsized and are
still attempting to recover from long-term displacement.30 It is uncer-
tain, for example, whether the current improvement in the job market
means that the downsizing trend has peaked. For one thing, the mild
economic recovery occurring since 1994 has not been robust even
though unemployment has remained low and inflation relatively con-
stant. When one looks to Western Europe where the unemployment
rates are "frightening," 31 one wonders whether American workers will
be facing yet another round of downsizing in the immediate future. In
Europe, downsizing has caused many white collar workers in their fif-
ties to take early-retirement packages which American workers would
envy.32 As businesses in the global marketplaces continue to stream-
line and cut costs, global competition will continue to put pressure on
American firms to downsize further, potentially precipitating a new
round of job cuts.
On the other hand, the April 1996 Report by the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors and the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that non-
farm employment grew by 8.5 million (7.8 percent) between January
1993 and March 1996.3 3 Private-sector payrolls were up by 8.7 percent
for the period, and unemployment had fallen from over 7 percent in
January 1993, to 5.6 percent in March 1996.34 The Bureau of Labor
Statistics projects that the labor force should grow by approximately
1.1 percent annually between 1994 and 2005 if current demographic
29. ld.
30. But see Judith H. Dobrzynski, supra note 13, at 10 (reporting that growth in new
jobs has enabled downsized older employees to obtain new employment at above-average
wages).
31. Kapstein, supra note 14, at 22.
32. See John Tagliabue, In Europe, a Wave of Layoffs Stuns White-Collar Workers,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1996, at Al.
33. See REPORT, supra note 26, at 23. In late July 1996, however, the media was re-
porting that job growth had slowed somewhat, suggesting that the mild recovery on the job
front was weak. See Richard W. Stevenson, Growth in Jobs Slowed in July, Breaking
Trend, N.Y. Timxs, Aug. 3, 1996, at A37.
34. See REPORT, supra note 26, at 23.
trends remain unchanged.35 The Report concluded on an optimistic
note: "The news is encouraging: employment has grown dispropor-
tionately in the industry/occupation job categories paying above me-
dian wages."'36 This was good news for President Clinton; he could
announce on the eve of the election that during his administration,
"[t]he United States has experienced faster employment growth than
any [of the] other G-7 countries. '37
One must, of course, take such self-serving campaign statements
with a grain of salt.3 8 The good news contained in the April 1996 Re-
port of the Council of Economic Advisors was in fact tempered by
some rather sobering facts for older workers, which the President and
his economic advisors downplayed in the pre-election media. The
Displaced Worker Survey,39 conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS), and analyzed in the Council of Economic Advisors' Re-
port, provides the basis for this conclusion.40 According to BLS's
Displaced Worker Survey, conducted in February 1994, there has been
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. The announcement of 8.5 million new jobs created since 1993 cannot fully
explain away other sobering trends such as the fact that more Americans have been laid off
since 1993 than in any previous three-year period since the government started counting in
1979, and the fact that workers' salaries have remained stagnant for the past 20 years. See
Alan Downs, The Wages of Downsizing, MOTHER JONES NEWs WIRE (July/Aug. 1996)
(available at: http://www.mojones.com/mother-jonesIJA96/downs.html).
38. This partisan spin was chronicled in the New York Tunes: "As Republicans ready
an attack on Pre'," 4ent Clinton's economic record, Democrats are working to offset wide-
spread anxiety among workers over layoffs and stagnant wages by arguing that the worst
days of the downsizing era are over." Louis Uchitelle, President's Theme: Layoffs Fall and
Wages Rise, N.Y. TiMEs, July 27, 1996, at A8. Uchitelle reported that most economists
argue that "a far more vigorous expansion than the present one is needed to raise wages
significantly and minimize layoffs." Id. Without a doubt, one of the central challenges for
President Clinton will be "to come up with a convincing 'narrative' that explains why
Americans are feeling so insecure in the first place." Elizabeth Kolbert & Adam Clymer,
The Politics of Layoffs: In Search of a Message, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 8, 1996, at Al, A12.
39. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1994 DISPLACED WORKER
SURVEY (Feb. 1994).
40. See REPORT, supra note 26. The Displaced Worker Survey conduced by BLS is
conducted only once every two years, and the most recent data then available was from the
1994 survey, which covered the 1991-92 period. Id. More recently, the BLS Worker Dis-
placement Survey issued on August 22, 1996 covering the period from January 1993
through December 1995 reported that a total of 3.8 million additional "long-tenured"
workers had been displaced for that period. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, WORKER DISPLACEMENT DURING THE MID-1990s 1 (Aug. 22, 1996). The 1996
BLS Survey revealed that workers in their prime working years, ages 25 through 54, con-
tinued to represent the majority of those downsized in the last two years, 78% of the total,
and one percentage point higher from the last survey. See id. at Table 8. The August 1996
data may have actually underestimated the level of job displacement in the 1993-95 period.
See BLS Correcting Displacement Worker Data, supra note 14, at 283.
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a "fundamental change in the incidence of job displacement of
workers." 41
Table I summarizes the displacement rates, defined as the
number of workers displaced per one hundred employed, for the two
recessionary periods: 1981-82 and 1991-92. A comparison of the ag-
gregate displacement rates for different age groups of nonagricultural
workers shows that older workers in the age category of fifty-five and
over have indeed experienced an increase in the incidence of displace-
ment which warranted the Advisors' announcement of a "fundamen-
tal change" in the displacement rates for older workers. Table I shows
that older, white-collar workers were comparatively more at risk of
displacement in 1991-92 than during the previous recessionary period
of 1981-82.
Table I
Changing Incidence of Displacement 42
DISPLACEMENT RATEs4 3  1981-82 1991-92
Total 3.9 3.8
Occupations
White-Collar 2.6 3.6
Blue-Collar 7.3 5.2
Age
25-34 5.0 3.8
35-44 3.8 3.9
45-54 3.0 3.8
55+ 3.6 4.3
What is significant about the BLS Survey is that the displacement
rates for older workers were higher during the 1991-92 recessionary
period than in 1981-1982, even though the recession of the early 1980s
was more severe than the one in the early 1990s. While it is difficult to
determine precisely what impact business cycles have on displacement
rates, the survey, based on 1991-92 data, shows that displacement
rates for older workers have clearly risen over the two periods mea-
sured. As Table I shows, older workers were considerably more at risk
of displacement in 1991-92 than in 1981-82.
Consequently, even though the displacement rates were roughly
the same proportionally in the 1991-92 and 1981-82 periods for all
workers, there was a corresponding increase in the displacement for
41. REPORT, supra note 26.
42. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcS, supra note 39.
43. Expressed as a percent of workers with three or more years of tenure on their
current job.
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workers who were fifty-five years old or older during the 1991-92 pe-
riod. In reviewing these displacement rates, the Report of the Council
of Economic Advisors acknowledged that "[t]hese changes in the inci-
dence of job displacement may be a reason for the reports [in the
press] of heightened anxiety regarding job loss." 44 The Report found
that those workers who have been largely immune to layoffs in the
past, including educated and highly-skilled workers, now represent a
category of workers who are increasingly likely to be displaced.45
While the BLS survey covered only the period between 1990 and
1992, the greater incidence of displacement for older workers will
more than likely continue to have an impact beyond the current eco-
nomic recovery. There are a number of reasons for this. Many older
workers who were downsized during the early 1990s have probably
dropped out of the labor market. Some may have elected to retire
early; others have been forced to obtain low paying jobs outside of
their career path. For those who have been lucky enough to obtain a
high paying job during the recent recovery, there may still be a loss
since seniority and other long-term service benefits have been erased.
Stewart J. Schwab describes this in terms of career "ladders:" "A ma-
jor cost of pursuing a career with one firm is that one foregoes other
ladders and must start over at the bottom if one leaves the firm."'46
Downsized workers who do obtain another good job will have to start
over at the bottom of the career ladder after reemployment. Finally,
the pressures of global competition and the failure of the American
economy to grow substantially will certainly cause firms to streamline
their production costs even further in the future. This will provide an
excuse for downsizing aging late-career workers who earn premium
wages and benefits by virtue of time spent with the firm.
Whereas for younger workers, "downsize" means a temporary
displacement between jobs, for the older late-career worker, "down-
size" means the permanent, irrevocable loss of a career job. For those
older workers who have devoted their entire working lives to a partic-
ular career job, downsizing during the early 1990s resulted in prema-
ture retirement, unemployment, or underemployment in the service
sector where most new jobs have been created since the early 1990s.
To understand why this is so, we need to consider the economics of
opportunistic dismissals generally before considering how opportunis-
tic downsizing can be practiced by American business.
44. See REPoRT, supra note 26.
45. Id.
46. Schwab, supra note 3, at 25.
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B. The Economics of Opportunistic Dismissals
The economics of opportunistic downsizing is based on the idea
that opportunism is a problem for career workers who have long-term
employment relationships. In the absence of detailed enforceable
contracts regulating behavior, parties to a long-term relationship can
still be "locked into" the relationship. 47 As Stewart J. Schwab has
noted, the inability to easily leave the relationship can be explained by
"a human capital story that emphasizes 'asset specificity.'"'4 Drawing
from Gary Becker's theory of human capital,49 Schwab explains why
wages of workers rise over a worker's life-cycle with the firm.
The "human-capital 'story" posits that employees will become
more productive as they obtain job-specific training. Because many
skills are learned by direct experience and are specific to the firm,
workers take on an "asset specificity" which makes them valuable to
the firm.50 However, because these firm-specific skills are not useful
to other firms,5' there is a question of whether the employer or the
employee should pay for the cost of job-specific training. If the em-
ployer pays there will be a problem since "the worker has no incentive
to stay with the firm because he earns no more than he could get else-
where, and so the firm risks losing the employee before it can recoup
its training investment." 52 The solution to this problem involves a
sharing of the costs and benefits of firm-specific training: the em-
ployee pays for the training by accepting lower wages during the train-
ing period occurring at the beginning cycle of the employment
relationship, and the employer then pays the employee a higher wage
after training.53 Schwab argues that, "[iln practice, these higher, post-
training wages take the form of seniority-based wages and late-vesting
47. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 3.
48. Schwab, supra note 3, at 13. As Schwab notes, Oliver E. Williamson coined the
term "asset specificity." Id. at 13 n.17 (citing OLrVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
CAPrrALISM 52-56 (1985)).
49. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL (2d ed. 1975). Becker's theory of human
capital predicts that workers, rather than the firm, will pay for job-specific training. How-
ever, in order to induce workers to pay for the training, employer must compensate them
with higher wages after they are trained. Hence, the theory predicts that wages rise with
seniority. Id. at 15-37.
50. Schwab, supra note 3, at 7.
51. Douglas L. Leslie points out that "[t]he key premise of the relational contract
model of labor markets is that many job skills are learned on the job and are specific to the
firm. Employees work in teams, and tasks are complex." Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bar-
gaining Units, 70 VA. L. Rnv. 353, 366-67 (1984).
52. Schwab, supra note 3, at 7-8.
53. Id. at 14.
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pensions, which induce workers to stay with the firm after training."54
What is critical to the human capital story is the "self-enforcing fea-
ture of the relationship." 55
An "expanded efficiency-wage story," however, explains why the
simple human-capital story is not always self-enforcing. The basic in-
sight behind the efficiency-wage story is that wages affect the effi-
ciency of workers. As Schwab has explained: "Because workers want
to keep the valuable job, they will work hard to avoid being dismissed.
In effect, high wages increase the penalty for being dismissed-a dis-
missed worker foregoes the large payout. Because workers labor
harder than otherwise, the firm can afford the higher
compensation. '56
The problem with this theory is, as economic studies suggest,
wages of workers who are nearing the end of a career with a particular
employer exceed the current productivity of the worker.57 Once
wages exceed the current productivity of the worker, the employer has
an economic incentive to terminate the relationship. The employer is
then in the position of reaping some of the benefits of job-specific
training without having to pay the employee for accepting lower
wages at early periods while training on the job. Late-career employ-
ees, however, can still be locked-in by virtue of having amassed a
stock of specific human capital in job-specific training with the firm.5 8
54. Id. at 15 (citing RONALD G. EHRENBERO & ROBERT S. SMrriH, MODERN LABOR
ECONOMICS 160-63, 410, 425-37 (4th ed. 1991)).
55. Schwab, supra note 3, at 15. As Schwab puts it:
Because the parties share the costs and benefits of training throughout the em-
ployee's" work life, both parties want to continue the relationship. The employer
pays employees less than their full value later in their career. This protects em-
ployees from discharge because a discharge would harm the employer as well.
The late-career wage exceeds, however, the outside wage the employee could re-
ceive, thereby discouraging the employee from quitting.
Id.
56. Id. at 16.
57. See James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More
Productive? The Case of Experience, 16 J. HuM. RESOURCEs 186 (1981); James L. Medoff
& Katharine G. Abraham, Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q. J. ECON. 703
(1980). Schwab has noted, however, that one of the puzzles posed by Becker's human-
capital theory is that the theory predicts that productivity increases faster than wages, but
studies of wage rates and productivity "suggest that workers' pay relative to others in their
job grade increases with seniority but their relative productivity does not." Schwab, supra
note 3, at 16.
58. These job-specific skills are non-transferable to other employers, and hence the
employee is locked-in by their prior sunk-cost investment in training. Studies confirm the
theory of human capital which posits that displaced workers who have long-time job-spe-
cific training suffer greater losses than those of workers with shorter job tenure (in the
same industry or occupation). See Robert Topel, Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages:
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Once locked-in, late-career employees become vulnerable to opportu-
nistic firings since the self-interest check on arbitrary firings no longer
exists; firing such a worker no longer hurts the employer, but is in-
stead in the employer's immediate economic interest.5 9
C. The Organizational and Industry Justifications for Downsizing
Across America, executives at large corporations, like General
Motors and International Business Machines (IBM), are struggling to
improve their performance in order to satisfy investors. Investors who
own shares in the corporation measure performance in terms of a ra-
tio based on earnings per share of stock. The higher the reported
profits of the firm, the higher will be the earnings per share and the
value of the stock traded on Wall Street. Chief Executive Officers'
(CEO) salaries are determined by corporate boards who are primarily
interested in satisfying shareholders and potential investors in the cor-
poration. In linking executive compensation to share price, incentives
have been created for management to cut costs through work force
reductions and downsizings.60
To justify the astronomical salaries that CEOs at some of the larg-
est corporations have received during the early 1990s,61 CEOs and top
managers needed to show that their leadership of the firm was profita-
ble for shareholders and investors. The pressure on CEOs and oper-
ating managers is to do whatever possible to show a positive earnings
performance. The competitive pressures from large corporations an-
nouncing substantial cuts in jobs in the early 1990s, in turn, had a
Wages Rise with Job Seniority, 99 J. POL. ECON. 145 (1991); James N. Brown, Why Do
Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job Training and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed
Within Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 971 (1989). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, DISPLACED WORKERS: TRENDS IN THE 1980s AND IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE FUTURE 2 n.3 (1993).
59. Schwab, supra note 3, at 19.
60. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 570-71.
61. See Sloan, supra note 21, at 43-44, 46. Commentators have noted that:
Many people contend that American executives are overpaid-and that they
should share the pain in bad times, or when layoffs are made.... Often cited is
Robert E. Allen, chief executive of AT&T. Since 1986, AT&T has cut its work
force by 125,000 people, but Mr. Allen's salary and bonus have increased four-
fold.... AT&T's board says Mr. Allen is the best man to lead AT&T in the new
era of deregulated telecommunications. But his critics point out that he also
headed AT&T in 1990, when it bought the big computer company NCR for $7.5
billion. The NCR acquisition, AT&T eventually conceded, was all but a complete
failure.
David E. Sanger & Steve Lohr, A Search for Answers to Avoid the Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1996, at A12.
strong influence on the business community. When IBM announced
its decision to cut thousands of jobs in early 1990, the announcement
was followed shortly thereafter by a wave of layoffs among other For-
tune 500 companies.62 The fact that the stock market tended to react
positively to these downsizing decisions created further pressure to cut
jobs. 63
CEOs and operating managers have thus looked to labor cost
savings as a means for improving the profitability of their operations.
One way to do this is to cut costs and streamline production in order
to reduce the cost of production in the short run. Indeed, during the
early 1990s, large corporations competed on the basis of cost-effi-
ciency strategies implemented to cut the cost of production. Numer-
ous factors spawned the "race-to-the-bottom" competition to
downsize, including executive compensation plans linked to share
price, a wave of dramatic downsizing announcements by major com-
panies, and the emergence of a new form of mass-production technol-
ogy in manufacturing and service industries.64 This new form of
competition was shaped by the implementation of information tech-
nology designed to cut costs by reducing the number of workers
needed in production. 65
Large manufacturing corporations, in attempting to stay ahead of
competitors, have cut costs by restructuring their operations, eliminat-
ing warehousing and financing costs through "lean production" tech-
niques, and "outsourcing" production to smaller, independent
manufacturers whose labor costs are lower.66 "Lean production" re-
fers to efforts by mass production industries to cut costs by reducing
the need for skilled labor in the production process and by maintain-
ing inventories that arrive "just in time" to save on warehousing and
financing costs.67 "Outsourcing" refers to the effort of large corpora-
62. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 570.
63. Id. at 571.
64. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at A14, A28; Capelli, supra note 14, at
570-71. I discussed how this new form of competition can be traced to postindustrial theo-
ries of corporate organization in my recent article. See Gary Minda, Aging Workers in The
Postindustrial Era, 26 STETSON L. REV. - (1996-97) (forthcoming legal symposium).
65. See Head, supra note 14, at 47 (describing how the mass-production economy has
threatened the job security of middle-income workers since the onset of the Industrial
Revolution).
66. See generally MARTIN KENNEY & RICHARD FLORIDA, BEYOND MASS PRODUC-
TION: THE JAPANESE SYSTEM AND ITS TRANSFER TO THE U.S. (1993). The literature is
summarized in Head, supra note 14, at 47-52.
67. Simon Head explains that "lean production" involves three main requirements:
"[P]roducts must be easy to assemble ('manufacturability'); workers must be less special-
ized in their skills ('flexibility of labor'); and stocks of inventory must be less costly to
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tions seeking to cut their costs by contracting out as much production
as possible to nonunion, low-paid workers.68
Many service industries including banks, insurance companies,
savings and loan institutions, retail and wholesale outlets, restaurants,
hotels, and information industries, have undergone a "reengineering
revolution" under process-centered principles which streamline job
tasks.69 This "revolution" resulted in the elimination of large numbers
of workers in many companies.70 According to Michael Hammer, a
chief proponent of the concept of reengineering: "The key word in
the definition of reengineering is 'process:' a complete end-to-end set
of activities that together create value for a customer. 71
In reality, reengineering is not new; what is new is the informa-
tion and service industries' application of computer software to
streamline and integrate the service process.v2 Unnecessary tasks are
eliminated, and information is shared among all individuals involved
in a "process" controlled by a relatively small number of "process spe-
cialists." These specialists use computer software to perform func-
tions once divided among a number of workers. Michael Hammer
states that "[t]he new processes often called for empowered frontline
individuals who would be provided with information and expected to
make their own decisions." 73
Reengineering has also meant that the conventional managers
and the role they performed in the old organizations had to be elimi-
nated. As Hammer put it:
Process centering starts a chain reaction that affects everyone
from the frontline performer to the CEO. Not only are old roles
either eliminated or transformed beyond recognition, but entirely
new ones, like process owner, come into being. If there were a sec-
tion in the Smithsonian for antiquated artifacts of the American
economy, the conventional manager would be the subject of a large
display case.74
maintain (components arrive at the assembly plant 'just in time,' and so save on both ware-
housing and financing costs)." Head, supra note 14, at 47.
68. See, ag., JEREMY RIMIN, THE END OF WORK 192 (1996).
69. See MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPORATION:
A MANUESTO FOR BusINEss REVOLUTION 31-82 (1994).
70. See Head, supra note 14, at 49.
71. Michael Hammer, BEYOND REENGINEERrNG: How THE PROCESS-CENTERED OR-
GANIZATION IS CHANGING OUR WoRK AND OUR LIVES xii (1996) [hereinafter HAMMER,
BEYOND REENGINEERING]. See also MICHAEL HAMMER, THE REENGINEERING REVOLU-
TION (1995).
72. See Head, supra note 14, at 49.
73. HAMMER, BEYOND REENGINEERING, supra note 71, at 7-8.
74. Id. at 92.
RIF and downsizing occur when businesses implement reen-
gineering and lean production strategies to reduce the number of
workers needed in the production process. "Reengineers" and "lean
managers" seek to cut as many costs as possible to stay ahead of com-
petitors, to increase profits, and to push up the earnings ratios and
share prices of the corporation. Because the compensation of the
CEO and top reengineers is linked to the corporate share price, the
new breed of reengineers and lean managers competes on the basis of
cutting labor costs, which are shaped by outside market forces.75
Labor cost containment strategies are not overtly suspect since
they can be justified on profit maximization grounds. In the past,
firms downsized by cutting jobs in order to save costs in response to
short-term economic conditions. However, downsizing during the
early 1990s was not precipitated by a cyclical downturn. In fact, the
layoffs occurred in the midst of economic recovery and job expan-
sion.76 Downsizing has become a corporate strategy motivated by cost
reduction, increased profit, and higher share price incentives. How-
ever, downsizing has been justified by the notion that eliminating ca-
reer workers is necessary to permit the corporation to stay profitable.
By eliminating high paying jobs or replacing highly paid workers
with less expensive workers, the firm can, so the argument goes, real-
ize substantial savings on its wage bill, maintain production levels, and
still be a competitive force in the global economy. However, if the
firm saves money on labor costs by downsizing, but total production
falls, or if the quality of the output declines, then downsizing will not
be cost efficient. Reducing the wage bill of the firm may not in and of
itself be efficient if the firm's productivity is negatively affected in
terms of total quantity, or the quality of the product declines because
replacement workers are less skilled. On the other hand, firms that
downsize older workers who are nearing the end of their working ca-
reers will downsize for strategic reasons, as noted above, because
these workers "often earn more than their current productivity. '77
It is important to emphasize that a salary which exceeds the
worker's current productivity may still be an "efficient wage." An
75. As Peter Cappelli has noted: "The circumstances that helped create formal ar-
rangements for managing employees in large firms, often referred to as internal labour
markets, are changing. Internalized employment arrangements that buffered jobs from
market pressures are giving way to arrangements that rely much more heavily on outside
forces to manage employees." Cappelli, supra note 14, at 563.
76. Id. at 576.
77. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. See also Schwab, supra note 3, at
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older worker who has invested in job-specific skills may actually be
receiving wages which partly repay the worker for incurring the cost
of job-specific skills. To allow the employer to terminate such an em-
ployee will be "opportunistic" because the employer seeks to avoid
repaying the employee for job-specific skills which are not transfera-
ble to other employers. Aging late-career employees who have
worked hard throughout their careers and who have avoided "shirk-
ing" on the job can reasonably expect to be rewarded for being effi-
cient workers. As Chief Judge Richard A. Posner has explained:
The older employee may be more productive by reason of his
greater experience, or he may be paid a higher wage either to dis-
courage shirking in his last period of employment or as a reward
(akin to a pension in the contract theory of pensions... ) for not
having shirked previously. If he is more productive, then he is not
in fact more costly to the firm than a younger, less well paid, but
also less productive worker.7 8
Thus, even if an older worker nearing retirement earns a rela-
tively high salary which exceeds that worker's current productivity, it
does not mean that such a worker is in fact earning more than an
"efficient" wage. As Posner has put it:
[I]f he is being paid a so-called 'efficiency' wage either to dis-
courage shirking or to repay the 'bond' that he posted as a young
employee by accepting a lower salary in exchange for an implicit
promise of compensation later if he behaved, he is merely receiving
the benefit of his bargain.79
But the "expanded efficiency wage story" suggests that these
workers will be vulnerable to downsizing as they near the end of their
careers with the firm.80 As Schwab has explained, once late-career
employees are paid more than they currently produce, they will be
vulnerable to opportunistic firing even though the higher wages of
such an employee can be justified in terms of job specific training that
the employee "paid for" by accepting lower wages during the em-
ployee's earlier work life with the firm.81 Because of the close connec-
tion between these workers' age and the time spent with the firm,
most late-career workers affected by downsizing will be over the age
of forty and will thus be within the age category protected by
78. PosrNER, supra note 7, at 336-37.
79. Id. at 337.
80. See Schwab, supra note 3, at 13.
81. Id. at 15.
ADEA.82 As to these late-career employees, a form of employer op-
portunism based on age discrimination can be perpetuated under the
guise of cost containment rationales.
A profit maximizing employer who decides to downsize highly
paid late-career employees will be motivated to terminate their posi-
tions because their salaries and benefits will likely exceed their cur-
rent productivity. However, because these employees have worked
hard during their careers and have invested in their own job training
by accepting lower wages during their initial employment with the
firm, they have "earned" the higher pay that they receive later in their
career. They are thus earning an "efficient" wage and are not really
being "overpaid. ' 83 These employees are entitled to the benefit of
the bargain, and the employer should not be permitted to renege on
an implicit promise establishing the long-term relationship and
thereby take unfair advantage of the employees' vulnerable position
created by substantial performance over years of service.
D. Why CEOs May Be Motivated to Act Opportunistically When They
Downsize
Much of the public debate about downsizing assumes that firms
downsize in order to be more cost efficient in today's global markets.
I want to suggest another possible explanation, one which is independ-
ent of the cost containment and efficiency rationales. To put it simply,
I suggest that the reason for the downsizing craze during the early
1990s can be explained in terms of a new form of competition that is
not based on product prices or costs, but rather, on corporate share
price. Since the 1987 crash, the market has exhibited skyrocketing
stock prices for some of the largest corporations listed on Standard &
Poor's Industrial Fortune 500 Index. During the early 1990s, the Dow
Jones average increased by 150 percent, and stock prices on the Dow
traded for about twenty-four times their average earnings.84 In such a
market, large corporations seeking to attract capital investments must
show a strong performance record, measured by the quarterly earn-
ings reports which are relied upon by investors in assessing the value
of the firm's stock. Moreover, because the compensation of CEOs
82. See Schwab, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that "[b]ecause of the close connection
between a worker's age and time he spends with the company, ADEA indirectly protects
late-career employees as well").
83. Id.
84. See Leslie Eaton, The Storm Clouds Gather Over Wall Street: How 1996 Is Like
1987, and How It Isn't, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1996, at C1, C7.
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and the top operating managers of most corporations has been tied to
the corporate share price,85 there are now strong personal economic
incentives for CEOs and top managers to downsize.86
Announcements of major downsizing by large corporations were
in fact followed by rising stock market prices throughout the 1990s.87
As reported in the New York Times, "[t]he day Sears announced it
was discarding 50,000 jobs, its stock climbed nearly 4 percent. The day
Xerox said it would prune 10,000 jobs, its stock surged 7 percent. 88
The positive reaction of the stock market to downsizing decisions cre-
ated increasing pressure to downsize.8 9 In essence, a new stock mar-
ket rationale emerged to justify downsizing; one which benefits CEOs,
operating managers, shareholders, and investors, but not workers or
the general economy. In cutting jobs to increase profits and share
price, downsizing has contributed to the deepening inequality of in-
come levels. A redistribution of income has consequently come about
as firm income is shifted from middle-class workers to executives and
top operating managers. Allan Greenspan warned Congress in July
1995 that the growing inequality of income in America could become
a "major threat to our society."90 As investment banker Felix
Rohatyn, senior partner of the Wall Street investment banking firm
Lazard Freres, has put it:
What is occurring is a huge transfer of wealth from lower
skilled, middle-class American workers to the owners of capital as-
85. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 576. See also Head, supra note 14, at 50 (discussing
a comment by Felix Rohatyn, senior partner of Wall Street investment banking firm La-
zard Freres).
86. See Capelli, supra note 14, at 576-78. Of course, such a strategy may not always
work since stock valuation involves a host of unpredictable and complicated exogenous
factors, not all of which are based on the firm's performance. On the other hand, if other
firms are downsizing to save costs, and if there is pressure on CEOs to show a positive
earnings performance to justify their compensation, then they may decide that downsizing
is an advantageous, if not necessary, strategy to protect their own jobs, even if only for one
quarter. It would be difficult for CEOs to resist the urge to downsize in order to show a
positive quarterly earnings record, especially when they themselves were seeking astro-
nomical salaries and benefits from their governing Board of Directors. See Sloan, supra
note 21.
87. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 570-71.
88. Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at A16.
89. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 571.
90. Head, supra note 14, at 47. As former Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich stated in
his last public address as Labor Secretary: "The gap between income, wealth and opportu-
nity (that began 15 years ago) is greater today than at any time in living memory." See
Reich Sounds Warning As He Bids Farewell, 154 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 48 (Jan. 20, 1997).
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sets and to a new technological aristocracy with a large element of
compensation tied to stock values.91
It may be that downsizing can quickly turn a poor earnings per
share ratio to a positive earnings ratio by reducing the cost of produc-
tion, and, for the immediate short run, improve the earnings picture of
the firm in a given quarter. Downsizing can be an effective technique
in influencing investors' perceptions of share valuations by showing a
healthy, albeit manipulated, quarterly earnings performance. This may
explain why a firm might implement a decision to downsize even if it
cannot justify its decision on strict cost containment and efficiency
grounds.
In looking at the labor costs of different groups of workers, CEOs
and operating managers of the firm are likely to conclude that aging
late-career employees are more costly to the firm than younger ones
because they receive a larger package of wages and benefits. Reduc-
ing the wage bill for these workers may be seen as a "quick fix" for
improving the firm's earnings performance in the short run, which can
influence investors' valuations of the firm's stock, and in turn affect
the share price and the compensation of top executives. In order to
attract investor capital, CEOs and operating managers want to keep
shareholders happy by showing a positive earnings performance.
They may decide that the "quick fix" of downsizing is the best way to
do this.
By downsizing aging late-career workers for cost containment
reasons, however, the corporation is in reality favoring younger work-
ers over older workers. Age thus becomes a factor, albeit an unstated
one, in the decision to downsize, even though the express reason given
is cost savings. The decision to downsize is rationalized by the firm
under cost containment rationales, but age status of employees is what
motivates the decision to downsize.
It should be no surprise that downsizing, the 1990s version of per-
manent career displacement, has become a cause of great anxiety for
older workers who have devoted an entire lifetime of employment to
a single employerf 2 Aging workers are prime candidates for downsiz-
91. Felix Rohatyn, Requiem for a Democrat, Speech at Wake Forest University (Mar.
17, 1995), quoted and cited in Head, supra note 14, at 47 n.12 [hereinafter Rohatyn, Speech
at Wake Forest Univ.].
92. See Cappelli, supra note 14, at 571. While worker loyalty to the corporation was
once rewarded with job security, today's loyal workers can not expect to hold on to their
jobs for more than a brief period. Most workers today can expect (if they are lucky) to
work for a number of different corporations during their working careers. See Uchitelle &
Kleinfield, supra note 1, at A17. Older workers, however, once they lose their jobs are
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ing because they are perceived by management as being more expen-
sive than younger workers. This is because most corporate decision-
makers, looking to the bottom line, tend to correlate wages with age
and length of service. Of course, age and salary do not always corre-
late. A recently hired forty-something employee may not have ren-
dered sufficient service to warrant higher wages and benefits when
compared to a twenty-eight year old who has been on the job longer.
On the other hand, because age and length of service do correlate
positively in most cases, many late-career employees are the first to go
when downsizing occurs.
Downsizing has consequently had its greatest impact on aging
late-career employees. They are in the class of workers who have suf-
fered the greatest economic hardships from losing career jobs. The
downsizing of older late-career workers seems to have created a "con-
tingent work force" made up of relatively highly paid, skilled older
workers. 93 This contingent work force of experienced workers has be-
come the target of downsizing because these workers are no longer
protected by the traditional, internalized labor market of the firm.94
After being downsized, aging workers are again displaced by what Fe-
lix Rohatyn has called the "harsh and cruel climate" of "advanced
capitalism." 95
While it is true that jobs have been created, many of the new jobs
"are in small companies that offer scant benefits and less pay, and
many are part-time positions with no benefits at all."'96 For those
older workers who have devoted their entire working lives to working
at a particular job, there will be few, if any, alternative positions avail-
able after downsizing.97 Given the current situation of older workers,
what protection, if any, can the downsized older worker expect from
unlikely to find equivalent employment. Downsizing frequently results in permanent un-
employment, or underemployment at best.
93. See Head, supra note 14, at 47.
94. Cappelli, supra, note 14, at 572. The internal labor market once checked em-
ployer power by forcing the employer to incur the cost of job-specific skills of the exper-
ienced worker. Large corporations are now making less of an investment in skills training
of new employees by forcing employees to absorb the cost of their own job training and by
forcing them to accept non-permanent (i.e., contingent) employment arrangements. See
Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment and the Para-
dox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1996).
95. Rohatyn, Speech at Wake Forest Univ., supra note 91. See also Ethan B. Kap-
stein, Workers and the World Economy, FoRErGN AFF., May/June 1996, at 26 (attributing
statement to Morris Kleiner of the University of Minnesota).
96. Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at A16.
97. Consider, for example, the plight of Steven Hothausen, a fifties-something bank
loan officer who used to make $1000 per week turned tourist guide, making $1000 per
existing anti-discrimination legislation? There is in fact very little
legal protection for older workers from the consequences of
downsizing.
H. The Age Discrimination Act in the New,
Ruthless Economy
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),98 enacted
in 1967, prohibits an employer from discriminating against any em-
ployee on the grounds that such employee is forty years of age, or
older.99 Initially, the protected class included only persons aged forty
to sixty-five, permitting a mandatory retirement at age sixty-five.' 00 In
1978, however, the age ceiling was raised to seventy, and then re-
moved altogether in 1986.101 Mandatory retirement at any age is now
forbidden by the act,'02 as is any measure by which an employer treats
an employee unfavorably because of age. One might think that the
law of age discrimination would provide a check against opportunistic
downsizing, but the reality is that age discrimination law is largely in-
month. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at Al. See also Rick Bragg, Big Holes
Where Dignity Used to Be, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al.
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
99. ADEA is broad in coverage and tracks Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The courts have thus looked to Title VII case law in
developing the law of ADEA. Title VII plaintiffs can prove employment discrimination
under either of two distinct legal theories-"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact."
A plaintiff who brings his or her claim under the disparate treatment theory must demon-
strate that the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, gender, religion,
or national origin. The disparate impact theory addresses employment practices that are
facially neutral but allegedly affect members of a protected class more harshly than those
outside the protected class. The disparate impact theory does not require proof of discrim-
inatory motive. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
In this Article I focus on how the disparate treatment theory of Title VII could extend
to cover what I call opportunistic downsizing discrimination based on the age of the em-
ployee. Opportunistic downsizing could conceivably be established under a disparate im-
pact theory by showing that the firm's downsizing decision has impacted more significantly
on late career workers over the age of 40. Some courts, however, have held that ADEA
does not recognize disparate impact claims. Compare EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41
F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995) (holding that disparate
impact theory of Title VII is not applicable to ADEA), with Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38
F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (contra). I leave it for another day to set out the argu-
ments for applying the disparate impact theory of Title VII to ADEA litigation involving
mass layoffs, RIF, and downsizing.
100. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202 § 12, 81 Stat.
607 (1967).
101. See Pub. L. 95-256 § 3(a), (b)(3), 92 Stat. 189, 190 (1978).
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1996). ADEA makes an exception for certain executive em-
ployees. See id. at § (c)(1).
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effectual when it comes to protecting older workers from this form of
opportunistic age-based disparate treatment.10 3
A. Limitations of ADEA
Reduction-in-force (RIF) strategies associated with restructuring
and downsizing are largely immune from ADEA regulation.104 Older
workers who are victims of RIFs have had a difficult time in establish-
ing prima facie claims of age discrimination because the employer can
always argue that a needed reduction of the work force was a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.105 Employers have
consequently been motivated to permanently lay off older workers as
they restructure and reduce the size of their work force without fear
of incurring ADEA liability. In RIF cases, employer claims of eco-
nomic necessity have become a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the permanent layoff of older late-career workers. Because older
late-career workers are usually more expensive than younger workers,
employers can always argue, and prove, that their decision to dis-
charge was based on the expense of maintaining the employees rather
than on the employees' age.
One might think that ADEA would prohibit this practice, since
lower paid, younger employees would be favored over higher paid
older employees. The courts might, for example, look to discrimina-
tion based on wages or length of service as a "proxy" for establishing a
prima facie showing of age discrimination. Of course, if, in a given
case, length of service did not "correlate" with age, or if a non-dis-
criminatory reason could be given for discharge, then the employer
could refute the prima facie case in the rebuttal stage of the litigation.
An employer decision seeking to cut costs by focusing on years of
103. The "first generation" of ADEA cases rested largely on evidence of subjective age
bias on the part of the defendant. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMrENT DISCRIMINATION 674 n.1 (1982). Many of these cases involved statements
by supervisors and other agents of the employer such as, "You can't teach an old dog new
tricks" or "old dogs won't hunt," from which age bias could be inferred. See Siegel v.
Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50,55 (3d Cir. 1990). As employers have become more sophis-
ticated in avoiding these statements, there has been an effort to develop new strategies for
establishing age bias in "second generation" age discrimination litigation.
104. See, eg., Allen v. Ethicon, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting
that "[tihe employment discrimination statutes were not intended to protect workers from
the harsh economic realities of common business decisions and the hardships associated
with corporate reorganizations, downsizings, plant closings, and relocations"). See also Al-
len v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 1994).
105. See Jessica Lind, Note, The Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in Reduction-
in-Force Cases, 94 MicH. L. Rnv. 832, 840 (1995) (noting that ADEA is "incapable of
providing remedies for subtle forms of discrimination").
service or salary status may not be circumstantial evidence of age dis-
crimination in every case,10 6 but in many cases it may be sufficient to
raise an inference of discriminatory intent in order to establish a
prima facie violation of ADEA. Liability would depend on whether
age actually motivated the employer's decision.
The difficulty of proving age discrimination this way, however, is
illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins.10 7 In Biggins, a sixty-two year old employee attempted to
prove that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his
age because he was fired just before the vesting of his pension.10 8 Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, found that the First
Circuit, in upholding the age discrimination claim, had improperly al-
lowed the plaintiff to establish his prima facie case using circumstan-
tial evidence of pension-plan interference. 09 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that the problem with plaintiff's proof was that he at-
tempted to infer age discrimination from length of service. As Justice
O'Connor explained, "ADEA only requires an employer to ignore an
employee's age ... it does not specify further characteristics that an
employer must also ignore."" 0
Under one view, Biggins precludes the use of the employee's pen-
sion status, salary level, and, presumably, length of service with the
firm as circumstantial evidence to prove unlawful age discrimination.
According to this view, Biggins rules out the possibility of using salary
and pension as a "proxy" for proving age discrimination.1 ' A prime
advocate of this view is Michael Zimmer, who has recently argued
that Biggins creates two serious impediments to age discrimination
claims." 2 First, it makes it easier for employers to defend against a
claim at the rebuttal stage.1 3 Instead of producing evidence that they
had "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" for their actions, employ-
106. See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. Rv. 563, 573 (1996).
107. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
108. Id. at 606.
109. Id. at 612.
110. Id.
111. This view of Biggins finds support in Justice O'Connor's statement that:
The employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee's remaining charac-
teristics, such as productivity, but must instead focus on those factors directly....
Because age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take
account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a
decision based on years of service is necessarily "age based."
507 U.S. at 611.
112. See Zimmer, supra note 106, at 571-72.
113. See id.
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ers can now satisfy their burden by producing evidence of any reason
so long as the reason is not age. 114 As Justice O'Connor explained in
Biggins, an employer who fires an older black worker because the
worker is black cannot be said to have violated ADEA. 115 She notes
that "[t]he employee's race is an improper reason, but it is improper
under Title VII, not ADEA. '"" 6
The second impediment established by Biggins, according to
Zimmer, is that the decision has restricted the "range of circumstantial
evidence upon which a fact finder can draw the inference of discrimi-
nation."'1 7 In refusing to allow the Biggins plaintiff to prove age dis-
crimination on the basis of the employer's pension interference, the
Court seemingly ruled out the possibility of proving unlawful motive
through circumstantial evidence based on an accumulation of years of
service.118 Professor Zimmer's interpretation has been echoed by the
Seventh Circuit in an opinion subsequent to Biggins." 9
If Zimmer's interpretation of Biggins is followed, then ADEA
would be of little help to older workers who lose their jobs whenever
their employer has any other non-age reasons for terminating employ-
ment. Pension status or length of service could not be used as proxies
for age, even though there might be a positive correlation between
pension status or length of service and age. In restricting the range of
circumstantial evidence, Biggins has potentially opened the door for
employers to escape ADEA liability by using length of service, pen-
sion status, and salary level as non-discriminatory proxies for firing
older workers.
On the other hand, there is an alternative reading of Biggins; one
which is more optimistic about the possibility of establishing age dis-
crimination claims on the basis of salary and pension status. This al-
114. See id. at 572.
115. 507 U.S. at 612.
116. Id. As Professor Zimmer has explained:
Thus, the rebuttal burden of the employer is no longer to produce evidence that it
had a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.' Instead, the employer can satisfy its
burden of production with evidence of any reason other than an admission that it
discriminated on the grounds plaintiff claims (or could still legally claim).
Zimmer, supra note 106, at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
117. Zimmer, supra note 106, at 572.
118. See id. Zimmer supported his position with a recent Second Circuit case, Bay v.
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1991), which rejected a "proxy"
age discrimination claim based on a higher salary and seniority due to age in a termination
case.
119. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
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ternative reading of Biggins finds support in the following statement
in the Court's opinion:
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who
targets employees with a particular pension status on the assump-
tion that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in
age discrimination. Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in
the sense that ADEA makes the two factors equivalent, cf. Metz,
828 F.2d at 1208 (using "proxy" to mean statutory equivalence), but
in the sense that the employer may suppose a correlation between
the two factors and act accordingly.120
In Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.,121 the case cited by Justice O'Connor,
the Seventh Circuit reversed a trial court judgment for an employer
who had fired a fifty-four year old manager and had replaced him with
a younger, less expensive co-worker. 122 The court concluded that the
district court had failed to give credit to evidence establishing that the
employer had replaced the older manager with a younger worker be-
cause his salary was too high. 23 Metz thus stood for the proposition
that salary may be used as a "proxy" or as circumstantial evidence for
proving age discrimination. Stewart J. Schwab argues that Justice
O'Connor's "enigmatic citation" to Metz supports the interpretation
that "ADEA protects older workers fired because their salary exceeds
current productivity."' 1 4 Schwab thus offers an alternative way of
reading Biggins; one which is decidedly more optimistic for plaintiffs
than the interpretation offered by Professor Zimmer. It should be
noted, however, that the Seventh Circuit itself has subsequently inter-
preted Biggins to support the opposite conclusion.'2-
Whether Biggins precludes older workers from using salary and
pension status as proxies for proving age discrimination is conse-
quently still a debatable proposition. It is still too early to tell which
of these two opposing views of Biggins will earn the support of the
Supreme Court. How the lower federal courts choose to construe
Biggins is critical to ADEA plaintiffs because "smoking gun" evi-
dence of age discrimination is rare today as employers have become
120. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 612-13.
121. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 1203.
123. Id. at 1208.
124. Schwab, supra note 3, at 44-45. But see PosER, supra note 7, at 337 (arguing that
"the Supreme Court has rejected this approach").
125. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
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more sophisticated in insulating their actions from ADEA attack. 126
In order for plaintiffs to enforce the policies established by Congress
for curbing age discrimination in employment, it is imperative that the
courts interpret ADEA to thwart more sophisticated attempts by em-
ployers to discriminate against aging workers on the basis of age.
Indeed, plaintiffs have lost most of the age discrimination suits
tried in the courts because of the strict prima facie requirement. Re-
cent published studies of ADEA litigation, for example, show that
plaintiffs do poorly, winning few of the cases they bring.' 27 The results
of these studies were recently confirmed by Chief Judge Posner of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In reviewing
ADEA cases litigated in his circuit, Posner concluded that only 11.4%
of the plaintiffs in his sample of hiring cases prevailed on their age
claims, 2' and that the average damage award represented only "a
modest expected gain for a federal case litigated all the way to final
judgment."' 29 In Posner's study, 20% of the firing and other discharge
cases reached verdicts, where the plaintiffs won 47.7% of the time.
Another 74.7% of the cases were disposed of by summary judgment,
126. As Posner has recently observed: "By now... employers have largely succeeded
in purging such slogans as 'you can't teach an old dog new tricks' from the vocabulary of
their supervisory and personnel staffs." PosNER, supra note 7, at 335.
127. See Michael Schuster & Christopher S. Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 64 (1984); Michael
Schuster et al., The Age Discrimination in Employment AcL An Evaluation of Federal and
State Enforcement, Employer Compliance and Employee Characteristics: A Final Report to
the NRTA-AARP Andrus Foundation (unpublished, School of Management, Syracuse Uni-
versity, June 30, 1987), cited in POSNER, supra note 7, at 330 n.16.
128. POSNER, supra note 7, at 328-39. Posner's study consisted of all federal court cases
under ADEA in which a final decision was rendered between January 1, 1993, and June 30,
1994, on other than procedural grounds and was reported in Westlaw, the West Publishing
Company's computerized database of judicial decisions. Id. at 330. As Posner notes, the
study was not based on a random sample, and therefore, the results of the study cannot be
assumed to be representative. Id. But Posner's study is reasonably consistent with earlier
studies in finding that age claims, especially in hiring cases, are both "relatively rare" and
usually unsuccessful.
129. Id. at 332. In the 29 cases in which the plaintiff obtained damages in lieu of or in
addition to equitable relief in Posner's study, the average damages award was $257,546. Id.
at 331. As Posner notes, however:
This is an unimpressive figure when one considers not only that the risk of win-
ning nothing is very great-so that when averaged together with the cases in my
sample in which the defendant won, the total damages awarded come to only
$29,360 per case, a modest expected gain for a federal case litigated all the way to
final judgment-but also that cases involving large stakes are likely to be over-
represented in a sample of cases litigated to judgment. In general, the greater the
stakes in a case, the more likely the case is to be litigated rather than to settle.
Id. at 331-32 (citing RIcHARD A. PosrER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 556 (4th ed.
1992)).
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where plaintiffs won only 1.6% of those cases; the remaining cases
were disposed of by other forms of judgment.130 Posner's study for the
Seventh Circuit was consistent with a recent nationwide survey of
plaintiffs' awards in discrimination suits for wrongful discharge in fed-
eral and state courts.' 31 According to this study, the rate of recovery
by plaintiffs had declined from 67% in 1988 to 48% in 1994 and
1995.132
B. Problems of Proof in RIF and Downsizing Cases
The reason most RIF and downsizing age discrimination cases do
so poorly for plaintiffs is that ADEA claims are difficult to prove on
every procedural level of the litigation. Consider, for example, what
the Supreme Court has said in the context of Title VII to be the "most
easily understood type of discrimination" claim-the individual dispa-
rate treatment case. 33 In the typical disparate treatment case, the
plaintiff will claim that she was displaced because she was over forty
years of age, but the courts will require that she prove a prima facie
case that the employer acted with an intent to discriminate. 34 An
ADEA plaintiff in a RIF or downsizing case can try to satisfy her ini-
tial burden of proof by relying upon circumstantial evidence. For ex-
ample, she might attempt to prove that the employer had downsized
130. POSNER, supra note 7, at 335 & n.25. See also Survey on Verdicts Shows Higher
Awards, Less [sic] Wins, 152 Lab. Rel. Rev. (BNA) 59 (May 13, 1996) [hereinafter Survey
on Verdicts] (reporting on survey of plaintiffs' awards in discrimination suits for wrongful
termination in federal and state courts showing that the rate of recovery by plaintiffs has
declined from 67% in 1988 to 48% in 1994 and 1995, whereas compensatory awards by
juries have increased by 56% in 1995).
131. Survey on Verdicts, supra note 130, at 59. This same survey reported that compen-
satory jury awards had reached a new high in 1995 with a median of $204,310-a one year
increase of 56%. The rise in jury awards may reflect that cases in which plaintiffs prevail
involve the most egregious cases of discrimination thus warranting large jury awards.
132. Id
133. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). As Professor Zimmer has noted, however: "The Court's reference to ease of un-
derstanding seems rather humorous" given that the concept of individual disparate treat-
ment "is difficult and complicated." Zimmer, supra note 106, at 563.
134. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981),
the Court clarified the procedural significance of the prima facie case by emphasizing that
circumstantial evidence of discrimination must support an unambiguous inference of un-
lawful discrimination in order to reduce the risk of putting employers to the expensive task
of defending frivolous claims. See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent
Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L.
REv. 1201, 1213 (1982) (discussing the similar standard under Title VII). These cases have
the effect of requiring the disparate treatment plaintiff to "establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by demonstrating that the most common, nondiscriminatory reasons for an
employer's actions do not apply." Zimmer, supra note 106, at 566.
[Vol. 48
March 1997] OPPORTUNISTIC DOWNSIZING OF AGING WORKERS 541
only those workers over the age of forty, and has since hired a new
group of younger replacement workers with fewer skills and less train-
ing to do the job.
RIF and downsizing cases are especially difficult for age discrimi-
nation plaintiffs under traditional requirements for a showing of a
prima facie case. The courts have imported the discrimination analy-
sis developed under Title VII (which regulates, among other things,
racial discrimination) in interpreting ADEA.135 In the context of Title
VII, the Supreme Court has sought to develop a unified structure for
individual disparate treatment discrimination claims. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 36 the Supreme Court identified four ele-
ments to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimi-
nation based on race in a hiring case.137 The four elements are: (1)
that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applications from persons with the same qualifications as
plaintiff.138
In the typical discharge case based on age discrimination, where
proof of unlawful intent must be established by circumstantial evi-
dence,139 the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case has been inter-
preted to require: (1) that plaintiff is in the protected age group; (2)
that he or she was discharged; (3) that at the time of the discharge he
or she was performing the job at a satisfactory level; and (4) following
135. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1981) (sur-
veying the case law on importing Title VII prima facie requirements to ADEA), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
136. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
137. Id. at 801.
138. Id. at 802.
139. ADEA violations may be established by direct or indirect evidence of unlawful
age discrimination. See United Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714
n.3 (1983); Lind, supra note 105, at 835-36. Because direct evidence of unlawful age dis-
crimination is rare, the courts have allowed ADEA plaintiffs to establish their prima facie
claims by circumstantial evidence. See Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80,
85 (2d Cir. 1990) (observing that there is usually no "smoking gun" evidence of unlawful
discrimination in ADEA cases); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 48
(3d Cir. 1989) (same). McDonnell Douglas thus establishes the judicial guidelines for dis-
crimination claims provable by circumstantial evidence. See Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
the discharge, he or she was replaced by an individual of comparable
qualifications outside the protected class. 140
Because the third element, satisfactory performance, is not rele-
vant in RIF cases, and because the fourth element, replacement,
would not apply in the RIF context,' 4' the courts are left with only the
first two elements for establishing the prima facie case in RIF cases.
The problem is that the first two elements of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case are, in and of themselves, quite incapable of raising a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful age discrimination. 42
In dealing with this problem, the lower federal courts have at-
tempted to construct a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
crafted especially for the RIF and downsizing contexts. 43 Unfortu-
nately, they have failed to develop a workable and consistent ap-
proach for how this should be done. 44 One approach, adopted by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Coburn v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 45 allows the plaintiff in the RIF context to establish an
unlawful inference of age discrimination by proving, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the employer had retained a younger em-
ployee whose job responsibilities were substantially the same as that
of the plaintiff's former job duties. 46
The Coburn standard attempts to modify the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie requirement by adding a new requirement that would en-
140. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 238-39 & n.5 (4th Cir.
1982).
141. This is because laid-off workers, whose jobs have been permanently displaced,
cannot "possibly show that their employer replaced them or sought applicants for a now
nonexistent position, as required by the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case." Lind, supra note 105, at 840. The replacement requirement thus requires that
another employee be hired or reassigned to perform the former employee's job duties. See
Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).
Replacement would not occur if an employee is permanently laid off and his or her job
duties were then redistributed among other existing employees already performing related
work. Id. See also Kesselring v. United Technologies Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (S.D.
Ohio 1991); Lind, supra note 105, at 840 n.45.
142. As Jessica Lind has explained:
The realties of a RIF render strict application of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case impractical. Laid-off employees whose job positions have been elimi-
nated cannot possibly show that their employer replaced them or sought appli-
cants for a now nonexistent position, as required by the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.
Lind, supra note 105, at 840.
143. See Lind, supra note 105, at 840-45.
144. Id.
145. 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
146. Id. at 343.
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able fact finders in RIF cases to decide whether the evidence justifies
a fair inference that a younger worker was treated more favorably
than the plaintiff.147 Under the Coburn prima facie standard, plain-
tiffs would not have to establish that they were more qualified than
the younger worker retained by the employer, but instead would
merely be required to show that they were within the protected age
category and were qualified for the jobs they previously held.148 The
Coburn standard thus constitutes a low-burden prima facie case be-
cause the relative qualifications of the plaintiff would not be a factor
in establishing the inference of unlawful discrimination.149
The Fifth Circuit adopted a different prima facie standard in Wil-
liams v. General Motors Corp.'50 In Williams, the court concluded
that in the RIF context, the question concerning plaintiff's prima facie
case "is not why members of the group were discharged or whether
they were meeting performance expectations, but whether the particu-
lar employees were selected for inclusion on the list for discharge be-
cause of their age."' 5 ' Instead of focusing on whether the employer
retained an equally qualified younger employee, the Fifth Circuit fo-
cused instead on whether the RIF plaintiff has "prov[ed] a set of facts
147. Id. at 342. See also Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1214 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1988); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
148. Coburn, 711 F.2d at 343. See also Lind, supra note 105, at 841.
149. All that is required at the prima facie stage is proof that the employer retained
younger employees whose job qualifications and responsibilities were the same as the
plaintiffs'. Coburn, 711 F.2d at 343. This has led Jessica Lind to complain that the Coburn
prima facie standard fails to support the necessary inference that the employer had en-
gaged in unlawful age discrimination. See Lind, supra note 105, at 842. Retention of
equally qualified younger employees is said not to be "inherently suspicious" "[b]ecause
employers almost invariably retain some younger employees in a workforce reduction, es-
pecially in a large-scale reorganization .... " Id. Lind also argues that the Coburn standard
fails to take into account the legitimate reasons for the employer's decision since in the
typical RIF scenario, "employers commonly justify their dismissal of an older plaintiff by
explaining that the plaintiff was less qualified than the retained younger employee." Id.
(footnote omitted). Lind concludes that "a presumption of age discrimination is inappro-
priate when the plaintiff shows only that the employer retained a younger, similarly situ-
ated employee." Id. at 843 (footnote omitted). This Article asserts that the focus of the
prima facie standard in RIF cases should be on whether the displaced worker is within the
protected age category (40 years or older); is a late-career worker (meaning a long-term
employee of the employer); has job-specific skills and training; and is targeted for dis-
charge because he or she is perceived by the employer to be too expensive.
150. 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). The Williams ap-
proach has been adopted by the 11th and 7th circuits. See Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp.,
907 F.2d 1077, 1081-84 (11th Cir. 1990); Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 95-
97 (7th Cir. 1985).
151. Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993).
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which would enable the fact finder to conclude with reasonable
probability that in the absence of any further explanation, the adverse
employment action was the product of age discrimination."'1 52
The Williams prima facie approach "simply asks the plaintiff to
produce evidence sufficient to support an inference that the employer
did not treat age neutrally, as required by ADEA.' 5 3 The Williams
standard may be either a "low" or "high" burden test since the fact
finder is left to decide for itself what evidence would suffice for prima
facie purposes. Moreover, because the Williams standard fails to in-
struct the fact finder as to what evidence is relevant to plaintiff's prima
facie burden, there is reason for believing that the standard may cause
confusion about the procedural framework crafted by the Supreme
Court for employment discrimination cases generally. 54 Formulating
a workable prima facie age discrimination standard for RIF and
downsizing cases thus requires that the courts first have an under-
standing of how age discrimination may actually be manifested in RIF
and downsizing contexts. Unfortunately, the decisions in cases like
Coburn and Williams have exhibited a lack of judicial understanding
about the nature and operation of age discrimination in these contexts
and consequently, the courts have been unable to develop a workable
152. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
153. Lind, supra note 105, at 843. See also Williams, 656 F.2d at 129-30. The Fifth
Circuit concluded in Williams that a prima facie case made on the relative performance of
employees may be established by showing: (1) the employee was protected by ADEA; (2)
he was selected for discharge from a larger group of candidates; (3) he was performing at a
level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those of the group retained; and (4) the
process of selection produced a residual work force of persons in the group containing
some unprotected persons who were performing at a level lower than that at which he was
performing. Williams, 12 F.3d at 1315 (citing Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1418
(4th Cir. 1991)).
154. See Lind, supra note 105, at 843-44 (arguing that the Williams approach "causes
confusion" by elevating the "pretext stage" of the discrimination case, a stage that nor-
mally follows the prima facie case and defendant's attempted rebuttal, to the prima facie
stage). Lind rightly argues that Williams leaves unanswered several thorny procedural
questions:
In elevating the pretext analysis to the prima facie stage should the court consider
all pretextual evidence at the prima facie stage or just enough to support an infer-
ence of discrimination, leaving the larger pretextual analysis for stage three? In
regard to the allocation of proof, should the burden of production still shift to the
defendant once the plaintiff presents enough evidence to support an inference of
discrimination or is such a shift justified only when the plaintiff eliminates the
most common proffered reasons for the adverse employment action? If the bur-
den of production does shift to the defendant, what specifically must the defend-
ant show if the plaintiff has disproved already the employer's proffered reason for
dismissing the plaintiff at the prima facie stage?
Id. at 845.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
March 1997] OPPORTUNISTIC DOWNSIZING OF AGING WORKERS 545
modification of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. To develop
a workable prima facie standard, the courts must first understand the
problem of age discrimination as it is practiced by corporate decision-
makers in the era of downsizing.
However, an understanding of the nature of age discrimination in
the RIF and downsizing contexts would require the courts to rethink
more than just the prima facie case. Indeed, the entire framework for
trying age discrimination cases would have to be retooled. The prob-
lem is that even if a workable prima facie case could be developed
from McDonnell Douglas for the RIF context, it would still be neces-
sary that the courts counter a host of evasive strategies that employers
could utilize to defeat liability for practicing age discrimination.
Under Zimmer's reading of the Biggins precedent, for example,
employers can argue that wage-justified decisions to downsize older
workers cannot be used as prima facie circumstantial evidence of age
discrimination. However, even if a prima facie case is established by
the plaintiff, the employer is allowed an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption of discriminatory motive by establishing legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for its actions. At the "rebuttal stage," the
employer can offer evidence to establish that it had nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions. 155 At this stage, the employer does not bear
the burden of persuasion, but must only produce admissible evidence
of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action to raise "a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff."156
Hence, even if a prima facie case of age discrimination is estab-
lished by the plaintiff, the employer can still evade ADEA liability by
asserting a cost containment or efficiency rationale as a legitimate
business justification for its actions. And, if the firm wants to truly
insulate its position from judicial reversal, it can undertake a host of
strategic actions to cover its true motives for downsizing. For exam-
ple, the firm could choose to downsize some younger workers along
with the older workers it wishes to eliminate. This is called "cash-
iering." As Posner recently observed: "[A] firm that wants to get rid
155. In the last stage of the litigation, the plaintiff is granted an opportunity to establish
that the defendant's proffered reasons for its actions were merely a "pretext" to cover an
unlawful motive to discriminate. In this last stage, the presumption of the prima facie case
drops out of the litigation, and the plaintiff is met with the general burden of establishing
that she was the victim of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Zimmer,
supra note 106, at 567-68.
156. Zimmer, supra note 106, at 567 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
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of an older employee can often do so with near impunity by cashiering
a younger employee at the same time."' 57 Cashiering of younger
workers remains a viable strategy for employers.
The Supreme Court recently concluded in O'Connor v. Consoli-
dated Coin Caterers Corp., a non-RIF case, that the fact that an older
employee was replaced by another employee over forty does not pre-
clude a prima facie case of age discrimination.158 The Court, however,
indicated that the fact that a younger employee has been hired to re-
place an older employee continues to be the touchstone for establish-
ing the prima facie case. As Justice Scalia stated for a unanimous
Court: "Because ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
and not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age dis-
crimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone
outside the protected class."' 5 9 What Justice Scalia and the Court
failed to consider is that cashiering of younger employees might be
used by employers in non-RIF and RIF cases to disguise their unlaw-
ful motive to discriminate against older workers. O'Connor may insu-
late this strategy from ADEA regulation.
There is yet another employer strategy which can effectively insu-
late employers from ADEA liability in most RIF contests-the "two
stage" RIF strategy. Most companies in fact conduct RIFs in two
stages. As Zeller and Mooney have noted:
The first phase is generally a voluntary program in which the
company offers incentives to induce early retirement or other vol-
untary separation by those employees who are not yet eligible for
normal retirement. The second phase is the involuntary termination
plan, focusing Uon position elimination, job performance, or some
mix of the two. 6°
The result of the two phase program of RIF has had the intended
consequence of persuading the older employee to voluntarily retire at
stage one. As Posner has noted:
157. PosNER, supra note 7, at 336. Posner concludes that:
[Cashiering] may be feasible because there is high turnover among young em-
ployees anyway and the firm may not yet have invested much in the young em-
ployee's firm-specific human capital (a principle reason why turnover of young
employees is high) and so [the employer] has little to lose from firing him, though
concern with reputation must inhibit this Machiavellian strategy to some and per-
haps to a great extent.
Id.
158. 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996).
159. Id.
160. Michael R. Zeller & Michael F. Mooney, Legally Reducing Work Forces in a Re-
cessionary Economy, HUM. RESOURCE PROF. 14, 15 (Spring 1992).
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[A]nyone who doesn't take the hint and retire early becomes a
candidate for phase 2-involuntary termination. And, should this
happen, he cannot count on having a good claim of age discrimina-
tion, let alone getting a good job with another employer .... [T]he
analysis suggests that it might actually pay an employer to engage in
outright age discrimination from time to time in order to increase
the incentive of older employees to elect early retirement.16
It should not be surprising then that plaintiffs in RIF cases have
faired so poorly in the courts. Employers can target aging late-career
workers for permanent layoff and insulate themselves from ADEA
liability by relying upon cost containment rationales, cashiering em-
ployees, and/or utilizing two-stage RIF strategies. The anti-discrimina-
tion principle of ADEA has been frustrated by new employer
strategies and judicial attitudes that have effectively insulated the em-
ployer's true motive from judicial scrutiny under the statute. Federal
judges have failed to comprehend how age discrimination is practiced
in RIF and downsizing cases because they have lacked convincing ex-
planations for understanding how age discrimination is practiced and
because they have been persuaded by conservative critiques of the
legislation that age discrimination is a rare phenomena.
The first step toward a more effective law prohibiting age discrim-
ination must be a new reconsideration of the problem of age discrimi-
nation in the era of downsizing. What is needed is an explanation of
how employers can practice age discrimination in the course of down-
sizing aging, late-career workers who have spent a working lifetime
acquiring job-specific skills. The theory of opportunistic downsizing
as discussed above can provide the basis for such an explanation. The
next section will briefly set out the framework for the theory of oppor-
tunistic downsizing by explaining how and why an employer might act
opportunistically in targeting older late-career employees for perma-
nent layoff in the downsizing era. In subsequent parts of this Article, I
will explain how opportunistic downsizing might be brought within the
reach of ADEA and ERISA.162
C. Opportunistic Downsizing-The MO99s Version of Age Discrimination
In rejecting the notion that wages could be a proxy for age, and
by failing to appreciate the implications of cashiering and two-stage
RIF, the courts have implicitly encouraged employers to engage in a
form of opportunistic downsizing-employers can target older late-
161. POSNER, supra note 7, at 341-42.
162. Part V of the Article will set out more fully the legal framework for bringing
opportunistic downsizing within the reach of ADEA and ERISA.
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career employees as prime candidates for permanent layoffs in order
to maximize the stock market rationale for downsizing. Because
workers are usually beyond the age of forty when they reach the end
of the career life-cycle, opportunistic firings are most likely to impact
older workers; the difference being that instead of calling their dismis-
sal an aged-based "firing," it is called "downsizing."
Late-career employees are vulnerable to opportunistic downsiz-
ing because they have invested substantial time in acquiring job-spe-
cific training-what economists call job-specific human capital-
which is valuable for their own employer and not other employers.163
Moreover, in adopting a particular career path with a single employer,
late-career employees have benefits which are tied to length of service
which make it expensive for them to quit and join another firm.164 As
a consequence of their chosen career paths, late-career employees are
locked-in with their firms in ways that make it economically unfeasi-
ble to change jobs. Employers, on the other hand, have a financial
incentive to downsize aging late-career employees instead of less-ex-
pensive employees in order to keep labor costs down. When this re-
sults in the displacement of older workers, it is an age-based decision
which should trigger prima facie liability under ADEA.
Unquestionably, thirty years ago, one would have expected un-
ions to curtail the efforts of employers to compete on the basis of la-
bor costs. 165 Downsizing would have been dealt with during direct
voluntary negotiations between the employer and a union selected by
the employees as their bargaining representative. At a minimum, la-
bor unions would have forced employers to justify their need to down-
size in order to compete, as the United Auto Workers attempted to do
163. See Schwab, supra note 3, at 26.
164. Id. at 24-25.
165. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 7-13 (1990). In the unionized sector of the work force, manage-
ment has relied upon the claim that cutting labor costs is necessary in order to streamline
the cost of production to render the firm more competitive in the global marketplace.
Thus, General Motors Corporation (G.M.) has recently publicized a study by an independ-
ent consulting firm showing that its labor costs for automobile parts are $440 higher per
vehicle than those of Ford Motor Company, and $600 more per vehicle than the Chrysler
Corporation's because G.M. relies on its own internal production of parts rather than out-
sourcing. See Keith Bradsher, G.M.'s Labor Costs for Parts Said to Be Higher Than Rivals,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1996, at D2. The study has been used by G.M. to bolster its bargain-
ing position in contract negotiations with the United Automobile Workers Union. The
union has criticized the study on the ground that the consulting firm that produced the
study "had looked only at labor costs and not included the lower quality and lower produc-
tivity at many suppliers." Id.
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in its 1996 contract negotiations with Ford.166 But since the 1970s,
union representation has fallen such that less than eleven percent of
the work force is now covered by collective bargaining. 167 Moreover,
unions themselves have lost much of their power and are no longer in
the position to resist downsizing and RIF strategies, even if they were
to make concessions and give back hard-won benefits. 168
With the decline of collective bargaining, there are now no effec-
tive checks on the potential for opportunistic downsizing of aging
workers. The market does not operate as an effective check because
opportunism is behavior that results from long-term employment rela-
tions arising out of the absence of detailed terms regulating the behav-
ior of parties.169 ADEA is, or ought to be, a check against late-career
opportunism in the era of downsizing. 170 ADEA, however, has failed
to provide such protection.
In today's corporate board rooms, it is the unrestrained "bottom
line" corporate decision-making tied to share price that drives the ef-
fort to downsize older workers. Because executive compensation is
frequently tied to stock values and quarterly profit (or loss) margins
today, executives in positions of power make labor relations decisions
on the basis of the "bottom line;" that is, whether or not the decision
will enhance the shareholders' investment by increasing stock prices
through positive profitability figures. In cutting labor costs, CEOs
hope to improve their profit/loss margins on the accounting ledgers so
that investors will perceive their stock as being undervalued.
What is missing in the stock portfolio analysis is a realistic assess-
ment of the relative productivity of workers who have firm-specific
skills because of their long service with the firm. Their salaries may be
reported as being higher than those of younger workers, but a higher
salary may be explained by the higher productivity of an experienced
worker, or it might be a type of reward for the cost of job training
absorbed by the employee when salary levels were lower. If an older
worker is more productive, then he or she may not be more costly to
166. See Keith Bradsher, U.A.W.'s Pact at Ford Aims at Downsizing, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
18, 1996, at D1. The new labor contract, negotiated between Ford and U.A.W. on Sept. 16,
1996, requires Ford to guarantee a minimum number of jobs in exchange for lower union
wages.
167. See Eileen McNamara, Working for the Workers, BALrMOnn SUN, June 21, 1996
at A21.
168. See Bradsher, supra note 166, at D1.
169. Goetz and Scott suggest that parties in long-term relational contracts typically
contract on the basis of vague terms. Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1092-93. See also
Schwab, supra note 3, at 20.
170. Cf. Schwab, supra note 3, at 43.
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the firm than a younger, less experienced worker. As Posner has ar-
gued, courts are not likely to take these factors into consideration in
ADEA cases: "All the court[s] can see is that the employer had a
reason unrelated to age for firing the older worker-he was more ex-
pensive."'1 71 In the era of downsizing, it is the "bottom line," more
than anything else, that drives corporate and some judicial thinking
today. In targeting older employees for downsizing, employers have
been utilizing the age of the worker as a basis for determining who
gets laid off. In failing to ascertain if older workers are in fact paid an
"efficient" wage, corporate decision-makers have utilized a cost con-
tainment rationale to cover an age discriminatory motive.
Some haive argued that if the employer actually tries to discrimi-
nate against older workers in the guise of cutting costs, the word will
get around that the employer is a bad employer and this "bad reputa-
tion" will discourage the employer and others from engaging in op-
portunistic behavior out of fear of losing the most productive workers
to competitors. Posner and Professor Epstein have both argued that
employer opportunism is unlikely to be a significant problem because
the employer's concern for its reputation will place a check on its op-
portunistic behavior. 172
However, an employer's reputation is unlikely to have a substan-
tial effect on younger job applicants. 173 Reputational effects will be a
check on employer behavior only if employees can act on the reputa-
tion by going elsewhere. 174 Job applicants may not be able to "assess
171. POSNER, supra note 7, at 337.
172. See id. at 342; Richard A. Epstein, InDefense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L.
REv. 947, 967-68 (1984).
173. As Posner has recently argued, the aging process entails cognitive changes in the
form of knowledge and subjective outlook which causes fundamental mental differences in
the individual's self-understanding. POSNER, supra note 7, at 8-9, 84-94. "[T]he difference
between one's young and one's old self may be so profound that the two selves are more
fruitfully viewed as two persons rather than as one." Id. at 8-9. This suggests that the self
definition of the individual changes with age, resulting in shifts in the individual's prefer-
ence function. A younger employee might discount the possibility that her employer will
act opportunistically toward her, even if she is aware of the fact that the employer has
acted opportunistically toward other employees.
For it is not a lack of information that drives a wedge between the young and the
old self. If it were, then as the number of very old people, nursing homes, geriat-
ric specialists, and so forth increased, as has been happening, young people would
find the prospect of becoming old less depressing. They would understand better
that most old people really do want to keep on living and do actually enjoy life as
distinct from merely dreading death. No such change in the outlook of the young
is discernible.
Id. at 87.
174. Cappelli, supra note 14, at 588.
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an employer's reputation for how it handles senior workers."'1 75 In
any event, "a reputation for harsh personnel policies may not greatly
harm declining firms that are not hiring many new workers. ' 176 When
all the leading firms are downsizing at the same time, employees will
have nowhere else to turn. 177 It is unlikely that unemployed workers
will cease seeking jobs from a firm because it has downsized older
workers. It is more likely that they will simply accept the fact that
they will have to switch jobs many times during their careers. In the
downsized labor markets of the 1990s, the bad reputation of a pro-
spective employer will not be much of a deterrent to job applicants
who have been unemployed for months, if not years.
Because reputational effects are not likely to be an effective
check on employer opportunism, legal checks are needed to guard
against such abuses, especially when age and pension discrimination
may be involved. Yet the courts have made it difficult for plaintiffs to
prove that downsizing of older employees can be a form of age dis-
crimination. Perhaps Posner is right in suggesting that the courts have
been slow to do anything about opportunism in age discrimination
cases because judges do not want to "make it difficult for firms to take
rational steps to reduce their costs when they find, for whatever rea-
son, that they are paying wages in excess of the market." 78 But if this
is the rationale for cases like Biggins, as Posner suggests, 79 then what
the courts are really saying is that ADEA is largely ineffective in the
era of downsizing. If this is true, then there is little, if anything, left of
the age discrimination law. ADEA would apply only in the rare case
where the plaintiff has some "smoking gun" evidence of age discrimi-
nation animus, say in the rare case where a supervisor or manager
utters one of those now classic "old dogs don't hunt" statements. 80
175. Schwab, supra note 3, at 27 (citing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORK-
PLAcE 74 (1990)).
176. Schwab, supra note 3, at 27. But a bad reputation as an employer may cause
active workers to work less hard. See also infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
177. Cappelli, supra note 14, at 588.
178. POSrER, supra note 7, at 337.
179. Id.
180. See Seigel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990). As Posner has
noted: "By now, however, employers have largely succeeded in purging such slogans as
'you can't teach an old dog new tricks' from the vocabulary of their supervisory and per-
sonnel staffs." POSNER, supra note 7, at 335.
IIM. Downsizing in the Era of the New,
Conservative Judiciary
An explanation for the decline of age discrimination in employ-
ment litigation81 ' can also be attributed to changes in judicial attitudes
which question the existence of age discrimination in employment.
Judges, like corporate CEOs, are "downsizing" age discrimination law
through new interpretative strategies which attempt to persuade us
that age discrimination is really not a problem in modem work places
of the post-industrial firm. Consider, for example, Posner's state-
ments about ADEA in his recent book, Aging and Old Age.'8 Posner
is responsible for reviewing ADEA decisions of district judges in his
circuit. His comments on ADEA provide clues for understanding why
ADEA plaintiffs have been having such a difficult time proving their
claims in the Seventh Circuit as well as other circuits, since his views
are representative of the new, conservative judiciary. Posner stated in
his book that ADEA is a "misbegotten venture in tilting at the wind-
mills of ageism;"' 8 3 that "[t]he age discrimination law is at once ineffi-
cient, regressive, and harmful to the elderly."'14
Posner claims that the age discrimination law is inefficient as well
as regressive because it forbids employers from using age as a basis for
assessing the value of an employee's contribution to the firm.18 5 "If
employers are forbidden to use efficient methods of evaluation, their
labor costs will rise, and it is now generally accepted that increases in
payroll taxes or other labor costs are borne largely by the workers
themselves, in the form of reduced wages or benefits.' 8 6 Posner be-
lieves that age discrimination legislation is bad because it creates an
181. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
182. POSNER, supra note 7, at 319-63. Posner's former colleague at the University of
Chicago Law School has offered a critique of ADEA and other anti-discrimination laws
which is similar to those offered by Posner. See EPSTEiN, supra note 12, ch. 21.
183. POSNER, supra note 7, at 361.
184. POSNER, supra note 7, at 319.
185. "We know that age is often correlated with performance; and with age being di-
rectly observable and performance not, it may be entirely rational for even the most intelli-
gent employer to use the former as a proxy for the latter." Id. at 325.
186. Id. Posner goes on to note that:
The increase in cost operates as a tax, and the incidence of a tax does not depend
on which side of the market (here, employer or employee) the tax is assessed on.
If employers are forced by law to keep on inefficient older workers, workers as a
whole, few of whom either are wealthy or are guilty of 'ageism,' will in effect be
taxed for the benefit of these older workers-yet the older, prosperous recipients
of substantial public largesse are implausible candidates for the status of an op-
pressed class.
Id. at 325-26.
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artificial interference with the ability of employers to evaluate the
contribution of older workers to the firm since the worker's age is an
efficient criterion of performance, albeit one which triggers suspicion
under ADEA. Because employers are forbidden to use the age proxy,
Posner asserts that employers are encouraged to use "other proxies
for ability or performance, such as test results, thus 'discriminating'
against workers whose performance those proxies underpredict.' u8 7
According to Posner, a worker's age is a useful characteristic that
employers need to consider in evaluating and predicting an em-
ployee's contribution to the firm. As Posner put it: "We know that
age is often correlated with performance; and with age being directly
observable and performance not, it may be entirely rational for even
the most intelligent employer to use the former as a proxy for the
latter."u 8 Posner thus argues that employers need to use age as a
proxy in evaluating the abilities of workers, because individual evalua-
tion would be too expensive. But why allow employers to use the age
proxy when the statute allows employers to take into account other
"reasonable factors," including "good cause," in taking action that ad-
versely affects older workers? 8 9 Posner fails to address this question.
Posner nonetheless believes that the age discrimination law is
harmful to older workers because it discourages "contracts in which a
worker agrees to work for a reduced wage, because of his diminished
capacity, in lieu of being discharged."' 90 If the law forces employers
187. Id. at 326. Posner gives the following example in making this argument: "Airlines,
for example, if forbidden to impose mandatory retirement on their pilots, might raise their
standards of physical fitness, with the result that some perfectly competent young pilots
might be forced out." Id. This example is off the mark since the airlines are permitted
under ADEA to take into account the physical fitness of pilots as a "reasonable factor."
See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(1) (declaring that it is not unlawful "to take any action otherwise
prohibited where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age"). Even
if forbidden to impose mandatory retirement on pilots, the airlines need not raise stan-
dards of physical fitness for all pilots to weed out unfit older ones; they can simply assess
the physical ability of older pilots without violating the age prohibition.
188. POSNER, supra note 7, at 325.
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) ("reasonable factors other than age"); 29 U.S.C. § 623(0
("good cause"). The point is that ADEA permits employers to come forward with evi-
dence of a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for their adverse actions against older
employees. See ZIMMER, supra note 103, at 705.
190. POSNER, supra note 7, at 348. As Posner notes, however:
The age discrimination law does not forbid such contracts, but it makes them
unattractive to employers. It is much easier to escape liability by discharging a
worker whose productivity has diminished because of his age than by attempting
to justify paying a lower wage to the elder of two workers who have the same job.
Id. If age discrimination is truly harmful to older workers, as Posner suggests, then how do
we interpret the results of Posner's study of age discrimination litigation which shows that
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to forego age-based employment criteria needed to make efficient
evaluations of the worker's value, Posner claims that some employers
may decide that the safest course of action is simply to avoid hiring
older workers.191 It is possible, however, that the same rationale en-
courages employers to fire otherwise efficient older workers for the
same reasons. According to Posner, age discrimination law hurts the
old as well as the young because it causes labor-market distortions
that interfere with the efficient equilibrium of supply and demand,
which operates to ensure that labor is paid a wage equal to the
worker's contribution to the firm.192 Firm-specific training, unlike
other types of general skills training, is valuable only to the firm where
the skills are learned. According to Posner, this is a major reason why
late-career employees must accept lower paying jobs:
[T]his is because the wages in their old jobs will have reflected
firm-specific human capital that disappeared when they left and that
they cannot readily replace because of the cost of learning new
skills, and also because the proximity of these workers to (volun-
tary) retirement reduces the expected return from investing in
learning new skills. 19 3
plaintiffs do so poorly in these cases? See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
Posner seems to be saying two inconsistent things: ADEA litigation is ineffectual given
that few plaintiffs succeed on their claims, and ADEA litigation is effectual in shaping
employer behavior. It would seem, however, that according to Posner's own study, older
workers who are victims of discrimination are more likely harmed by ineffectual enforce-
ment of age discrimination law. One must also question Posner's assumption that in the
absence of age discrimination law, elder workers would be given a choice to accept re-
duced wages in lieu of being discharged in recessionary periods. The current displacement
rates for older workers noted in Table I, supra, suggest that elder workers have no choice
in recessionary periods when employers seek to reduce their labor costs by eliminating
aging workers who have relatively higher wages. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying
text.
191. POSNER, supra note 7, at 348. This argument fails to take into account what hap-
pens when an older late-career worker is downsized. Such a worker is more likely forced
to accept a lower paying job outside the worker's former career because job-specific skills
are not transferable to new employers and because other employers are less likely to hire
an older worker for a new position that will entail years of job training. Older workers
have most likely agreed to work for a reduced wage after being downsized because they
are not protected by ADEA.
192. Id. at 347-49. Posner thus draws from Gary Becker's human-capital theory which
explained why wages rise with seniority, and why employees rather than employers vAill
pay for firm-specific training. See BECKER, supra note 49, at 15-37. Under Becker's
human-capital model, employees become more productive as they obtain firm-specific
training. Id. Firm-specific training increases the productivity of the worker and thus
reduces the worker's cost to the employer. Id.
193. POSNER, supra note 7, at 321 (citing Diane E. Merz & Philip L. Rones, Institu-
tional Barriers to Employment of Older Workers, 112 MONTHLY LAB. Rnv., Apr. 1989, at
14, 20).
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Posner argues that this helps- to refute the conclusion of those
who attribute age discrimination motives to employers who pay older
workers less than what they had been earning at other jobs.' 94 The
fact that the average wages of older workers are lower can, according
to Posner, be explained by reasons unrelated to discrimination. 195
Wage rates of late-career employees will fall when they move to an-
other job because their investment in job-specific training is a non-
transferable sunk cost. Posner, however, ignores the problem of op-
portunistic behavior, which Schwab's analysis of late-career employ-
ment has identified as a critical aspect of age discrimination in career
employment.196 To appreciate why Posner ignores problems of oppor-
tunistic behavior, one needs to consider what Posner has to say about
two types of age discrimination: "animus" and "statistical"
discrimination.
"Animus discrimination," or what employment law lawyers know
as individual disparate treatment discrimination, is said to be "moti-
vated by ignorance, viciousness, or irrationality, with respect to the
value of older people in the workplace."'197 Animus discrimination in-
volves a form of discrimination based on resentment or disdain for
older people in our society. "Statistical discrimination," or what em-
ployment law lawyers know as disparate impact discrimination, con-
sists of "attributing to all people of a particular age the characteristics
of the average person of that age."' 98 This "is an example of what
economists call statistical discrimination and noneconomists [call]
'stereotyping:' the failure or refusal, normally motivated by the costs
of information, to distinguish a particular member of a group from the
average member."'199
Posner asserts that animus discrimination is "implausible" in the
workplace because the people making employment decisions for cor-
porations about hiring and firing are "at least 40 years old and often
much older.' '20° Because the very people who make employment pol-
icy decisions are themselves older, Posner believes that it is unlikely
that they would engage in "animus discrimination." 20' Posner con-
194. Id. at 321.
195. Id.
196. See Schwab, supra note 3, at 43-47.
197. POSNER, supra note 7, at 320.
198. Id. at 322.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 320.
201. Id. Animus discrimination, according to Posner, involves a type of "we-they"
thinking characteristic of racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination. Id.
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tends that "we-they" thinking is unlikely to play a large role in the
treatment of the older worker:
It is as if the vast majority of persons who established employ-
ment policies and who made employment decisions were black, fed-
eral legislation mandated huge transfer payments from whites to
blacks, and blacks occupied most high political offices in the nation.
It would be mad in those circumstances to think the nation needed a
law that would protect blacks from discrimination in
employment.2o2
Posner believes that the existence of statistical discrimination is
"more plausible," but that this form of discrimination is needed by
employers to reduce the cost of making individualized assessments of
workers. 20 3 The age proxy is, according to Posner, an efficient and
indispensable tool used by employers to "weed out" inefficient
workers. 204
Posner is correct in emphasizing that it is the ability to perceive
difference that is the most important characteristic of discriminatory
behavior generally. Perceived differences are the codes that motivate
hierarchical attitudes and beliefs which foster a form of "we-they"
thinking necessary for racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual orientation
discrimination. In the case of ageism at the work place, however, the
"we-they" or "us-them" thinking is quite plausible when viewed
within the context of corporate cultures which shape the "corporate
concept of self" of top managers. The corporate concept of self is tied
to the institutional interests of the corporation, and those interests are
shaped by a culture that values youthful appearances and provides
economic incentives to executives who reduce costs and increase
profits.205
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 327-28. Posner raises and rejects an argument that statistical discrimination
is inefficient in the case of age because it may cause employees to make a suboptimal
investment in their human capital, "because the payback period will be artificially trun-
cated." Posner explains:
A middle-aged professional who rationally believes that he has and will retain
youthful energy and intellectual flexibility will nevertheless forego making an in-
vestment in human capital that would not be completely amortized until he was
70 years old, if he thinks that he will be forced to retire at age 65 or denied a
promotion merely because of the average characteristics of his age cohort.
Id. at 327. Posner concludes that the argument that statistical discrimination is inefficient is
"unpersuasive" because "prohibiting the use of the age proxy will lead to the substitution
of other proxies" such that "[t]he problem of underinvestment will be shifted, not solved."
Id.
205. There is in fact some anecdotal evidence suggesting that forty-something execu-
tives are taking some rather extreme measures to maintain a youthful self-image. As re-
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Legal theorists have long since discarded the antiquated concept
which regards individuals as having an "unencumbered" concept of
self.2 °6 Posner seemingly acknowledges this in recognizing that "[t]he
idea that the individual can be modeled as a locus of competing selves
(simultaneous or successive) is not new" even though "it remains eso-
teric and is disregarded in most economic analysis. '207 On the other
hand, assuming that a corporate decision-maker over the age of forty
would have the same outlook and concept of self of a forty-something
downsized worker, Posner uncritically and mistakenly assumes that
age renders an individual's concept of self unencumbered by context.
What Posner fails to recognize is that corporate decision-makers, even
though they may themselves be over the age of forty, may have inter-
nalized a corporate concept of self situated within a culture which val-
ues youth and exhibits a bias against late-career aging workers who
are as old as they.
The fact that the people who do the hiring and firing are gener-
ally as old as the people they hire and fire does not therefore mean
that animus discrimination is "implausible" in the face-lifted, tummy-
tucked jungle of corporate America. 208 The new-style manager
cently reported in the New York Times, CEOs and high level managers are taking their
hard earned salaries and investing in face-lifts, tummy-tucks, hair-coloring, and other cos-
metic and fashion techniques to look younger on the job. See Amy M. Spindler, It's a Face-
Lifted, Tummy-Tucked Jungle Out There: Fearing the Ax, Men Choose the Scalpel, N.Y.
armis, June 9, 1996, § 3, at 1. "Because of downsizing[,] the 50-year-old is in competition
with the 30-year-old." Id. at 8. Older executives are thus turning to hair coloring and
cosmetic surgery to maintain the appearance of youth. In the youth-dominated world of
the downsized corporations, executives are getting "face lifts and mouth bridgework" and
"tummy tuckers and elevator shoes" to shed years from the resumes. Id. It has been re-
ported, for example, that "sales of a Clairol product, Men's Choice hair coloring, have
risen 30 percent in three years" and according to the company's own study, "10 percent of
the 45 million American men in their 40s and 50s were coloring their hair." Id. As one
cosmetic trade industry executive put it: "Look at Bob Dole. Is he walking around with
white hair? Go walk through the executive suite. You don't see many pouchy-looking
people." Id. (citing statement of Dale Winston, President of Battalia Winston Interna-
tional). The fact that corporate executives are resorting to expensive and risky surgical
measures to appear young may suggest that corporate decision-makers are attempting to
identify their concept of self with that of a younger person. They are trying to look youth-
ful in today's corporate culture of downsizing because they know that in today's corporate
environment, advanced age is not a virtue. Indeed, looking old seems to be a good way of
targeting oneself as a potential candidate for downsizing. Animus discrimination is quite
plausible when one considers how the current corporate culture seems to associate a
youthful appearance with success and employment.
206. See Michael Sandel, Introduction, in LiBERALISM AND ITS CRIcs 6, 6-7 (M.
Sandel ed., 1982).
207. POSNER, supra note 7, at 84.
208. Ironically, there has been a positive job justification for this: "[D]ownsizing seems
to have helped spur a boom in another area: businesses that offer shortcuts for making
schooled in the techniques of reengineering and lean manufacturing is
likely to see late-career employees as being out of touch with the
modern process orientation and therefore "old," in terms of what it
takes to be successful for today's management.
As the business consultant Michael Hammer has said of conven-
tional managers who are being replaced by a "handful of process own-
ers and coaches:"
Most of what managers have learned from advancing them-
selves in a traditional structure is at best useless and at worst dys-
functional for the new environment. Very few have the disciplined
process design and improvement skills required for process owner-
ship. Even fewer are comfortable with personal coaching after
years in a corporate culture that put a premium on ambition, ag-
gression, and personal toughness. Many old-style managers won't
want to make the transition-not because the transition itself is so
tough, but because the new work is. One insightful executive who
has adapted speaks of "a trick" having been played on managers.
One reason many of them worked hard when they were young, he
explains, was to get to a senior level where they would be able to
ease up and enjoy their perks. But the new-style management,
which requires a relentless drive for continuous improvement or an
intense concern for enhancing people and their abilities, is extraor-
dinarily demanding. The net result of all this is that most companies
find themselves awash in surplus managers-and simultaneously
hard-pressed to fill the new roles of coach and process owner.209
Hammer's chilling assessment of the plight of the "old-style"
managers describes how the emerging culture of the firm is shaping
corporate thinking about downsizing and restructuring. In the new
cultural environment of the corporation, workers must be sacrificed to
salvage the organization.210 As R. Alan Hunter, president of Stanley
Works, rhetorically put it: "Is it better to have 100 people in a world-
class plant or 120 in a plant that is not world-class and might not sur-
vive?" 211 The prevailing corporate wisdom seems to be that "unless
companies are free to shrink-or die altogether-the American econ-
omy will come to resemble those of European nations, where the so-
cial prohibition against layoffs has made companies reluctant to
expand or test new business [strategies]."212 The emerging ideology of
reengineering and lean production of the new corporation thus en-
men look young, healthy and fit. Call it an era of faux fitness." Spindler, supra note 205, at
1.
209. HAMMER, BEYOND REENGINEERING, supra note 71, at 130-31.
210. Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 1, at A16.
211. 1&
212. HAMMER, BEYOND ENGINEERING, supra note 71, at 197. It is worth noting that
European firms have apparently gotten the message since they have begun to downsize
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courages senior executives to accept the inevitability of downsizing
older late-career workers in order to save the organization from the
imagined dire consequences of global competition.
There is, of course, some reason to believe that downsizing can
lead to "immediate rewards on Wall Street, as investors bid up the
share prices of companies that announce [job] cuts, '213 even though
there is "scant evidence that downsizing helps investors" or is a consis-
tent long-term profit-maximization strategy for the firm.214 The pre-
vailing folklore of corporate culture helps to explain why the people
who make employment policies for corporate employers are able to
rationalize the need to terminate the employment relation of career
workers who are of equal age and seniority. To put the point differ-
ently, the kind of "we-they" thinking which Posner claims fosters ra-
cial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is a very plausible mechanism
that affects the treatment of older workers targeted for downsizing.
Downsized workers, who are unable to buy tummy tucks or face
lifts, are never given a chance to show that they can fill the "new roles
of coach and process owner" in the reengineered and lean manufac-
turing firm. They are the ones who must accept the hardships of
downsizing, not CEOs, top managers, or shareholders. In thinking of
late-career employees as "human capital" assets of the corporation,
senior executives are able to distance themselves from the human di-
mension of downsizing decision-making. They become accustomed to
the notion that aging workers are like a used-up piece of machinery
which must be "discarded" to make room for a new and improved
process of production. The "downsized" expectations of employees
consequently create a growing sense in the work force of less security,
less stability, and an overall absence of a shared civic life.2 15 These
their work forces at about the same pace practiced by American firms in the early 1990s.
Iad
213. Id. at 199.
214. Id. at 199-200 (reporting on a study by Wayne Cascio, a professor of management
at the University of Colorado, which tracked the stock prices of 25 companies that down-
sized over a 3 year period and concluded that "downsizing is no magic bullet," because
"[o]ften, there is no payoff").
215. In Dayton, Ohio, downsizing at the National Cash Register Company resulted in
the elimination of 20,000 jobs, bringing about a ripple of economic, social, and political
catastrophes that have forever changed the way people live. See Sara Rimer, A Hometown
Feels Less Like Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at Al. Volunteer workers are difficult to
recruit now as many of those who provided service in the past have moved away. Id- New
jobs have been created but many of them have been in the lower-paying retail and service
field forcing mothers to work in order to meet family expenses. Id, The constant move-
ment of families into and out of the community has made it difficult for anyone to get to
know each other, and the longer hours of work have pretty much eliminated any opportu-
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"costs" do not go into the decision-mix leading to the downsizing of
older workers. Employees feel more vulnerable and therefore less
willing to work as hard if they believe they may be let go in the near
future.216
Opportunistic behavior toward late-career workers should be an
important justification for ADEA regulation, and an important reason
for enforcing age discrimination law. As Schwab noted: "By prohibit-
ing employers from firing workers above the age of forty because of
their age, ADEA protects older workers from discharges based upon
stereotypes that lead employers to underestimate their productiv-
ity.' 217 An older worker's contribution to the firm is likely to be un-
derestimated whenever downsizing is involved because individual
evaluation of each worker's contribution to the firm is not performed
and because bottom-line profit and loss thinking is the dominant crite-
rion in deciding whom to downsize.
As previously noted,218 one of the most disturbing consequences
of the downsizing phenomenon is that it may encourage corporate de-
cision-makers to positively correlate age and labor cost without con-
sidering the value of the older worker's contribution to the firm in
earlier periods. This is because downsizing takes into account only
one factor-the current wage level of the employee. "Companies add
up their costs per employee and say, 'If we have 10,000 fewer employ-
ees, that will save us that much in expenses and make us that much
more profitable.' So they cut 10,000 people. 21 9 While these layoffs
affect all workers, it is the older worker who is most likely to be a
candidate for being downsized because he or she will likely earn a
higher salary and level of benefits due to increased productivity as a
result of firm-specific training and experience.220
nities for much social and civic life. Id. Dayton's identity seems to have been lost, as its
citizens work two or three jobs to make up for the economic loss of being downsized. Id
For those workers who have survived the latest round of downsizing, there is a feeling of
impending doom of future downsizing to deal with on a daily basis. Id.
216. Human-capital theory predicts that workers will be more willing to invest in job
training the longer they expect to remain working. See Anne Beeson Royalty, The Effects
Of Job Turnover On The Training of Men and Women, 49 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 506
(1996). See also Schwab, supra note 3, at 21-24 (discussing employer vulnerability to
shirking).
217. Schwab, supra note 3, at 43.
218. See Part I supra.
219. Sanger & Lohr, supra note 61, at A12.
220. As Posner acknowledges:
The older employee may be more productive by reason of his greater experience,
or he may be paid a higher wage either to discourage shirking in his last period of
employment or as a reward (akin to a pension) for not having shirked previously.
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As Posner's analysis suggests, however, advanced age is unlikely
to be a good predictor of the likelihood that a plaintiff would win an
age discrimination suit because "[t]he older the employee, the easier it
will be for the employer to make a plausible case that the employee
was fired [or downsized] because he was failing or too expensive, and
not because of his age as such."2' Posner's intellectual arguments for
"downsizing" age discrimination law thus ignore the potential for op-
portunistic behavior in long-term career employment. In ignoring the
dangers of opportunistic firings and downsizings, Posner subordinates
the anti-discrimination principle of ADEA to the cost containment
rationales of business.
What is interesting about Posner's arguments is that they are be-
ing made not by a wild-eyed legal academic but by a former conserva-
tive legal academic who is now a respected federal circuit chief judge
responsible for enforcing federal anti-discrimination law at the very
time that corporate America is engaged in a sustained policy of per-
manent displacement of older workers. Downsizing is apparently a
phenomenon that is occurring in jurisprudence as well as in labor mar-
kets. Age discrimination law is downsized by a jurisprudence that
supports and defends the "harsh and cruel climate" of "advanced cap-
italism," and overlooks the sad realities of the plight of most older
workers today.
IV. Downsizing and Pension Discrimination
There are other legal remedies which the downsized older em-
ployee might seek in addition to those of ADEA.m2 In the Biggins
case, for example, the Supreme Court found that while the sixty-two
year old employee who claimed that he was fired just before the vest-
ing of his retirement pension failed to state a cause of action under
ADEA, he was entitled to pursue a claim under section 510 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 - ER-
ISA is a complex statute that was created mainly to protect pension
benefits and other types of deferred compensation. Section 510 of
ERISA makes it unlawful "for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
If he is more productive, then he is not in fact more costly to the firm than a
younger, less well paid, but also less productive worker.
POSNER, supra note 7, at 336-37.
221. Id. at 337.
222. Curiously, both Posner and Epstein ignore pension discrimination in employment
under ERISA.
223. See generally Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of
an employee benefit plan. '2 24 One might argue, as the Biggins plain-
tiff argued, 22 that downsizing of an older employee whose retirement
benefits are about to vest constitutes a prima facie violation of section
510 since the permanent layoff of the employee may have been moti-
vated by a desire to interfere with the employee's pension benefits
protected under ERISA.
A. Limitations of ERISA Discrimination Litigation
ERISA claims, however, are not likely to prevail for the same
reason that ADEA claims do poorly in the courts. ERISA plaintiffs
are required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their
discharge was motivated by an intent to interfere with their benefits
protected by ERISA.226 In order to establish proof of the intent to
discriminate, the ERISA plaintiff is very much in the same position as
an ADEA plaintiff seeking to prove unlawful age discrimination.
What makes it hard for these plaintiffs to successfully establish their
discrimination claims is that employers can claim that they were dis-
charged for cost containment reasons-a nondiscriminatory business
justification. Indeed, in the ERISA context, discrimination is even
harder to prove since the courts frequently defer to the business judg-
ment of trustees about matters such as cost containment and the fi-
nancial integrity of pension plans.227 Consequently, once the
employer establishes a legitimate business reason for its action the
ERISA case is over.
In McGann v. H&H Music Co.,2 28 for example, an employer
capped the health benefits for AIDS-infected workers after learning
that one of his employees was infected with AIDS. The cap imposed a
lifetime maximum of $5000 for AIDS-related claims, whereas previ-
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1974).
225. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 608.
226. See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 650 (10th Cir. 1993) (dismissal
of an HIV-positive employee covered under an ERISA plan held not to be unlawful dis-
crimination under ERISA because the employer had non-discriminatory reasons to justify
the dismissal).
227. For a discussion of the case law, see Lorraine Schmall. Toward Full Participation
and Protection of the Worker with Illness: The Failure of Federal Health Law After Mc-
Gann v. H&H Music Co., 29 WArE FoRESr L. REv. 781,806 n.134 (1994). Folz v. Marriott
Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984), is an exception, but as Professor Schmall notes,
"[v]ery few courts have followed Folz." Id. at 806.
228. 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
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ously there had been a one million dollar limit.229 The plaintiff
claimed that the employer discriminated against him in violation of
section 510 on the grounds that the AIDS-related cap was a retaliation
for the exercise of his rights under the employer's medical plan cov-
ered by ERISA. 30 The employer argued in its defense that the cap
on AIDS-related benefits was necessary to protect the financial integ-
rity of the plan.231 The Fifth Circuit accepted the employer's position
and dismissed the discrimination claim after concluding that the em-
ployer had acted in the best interest of the beneficiaries as a whole in
protecting the plan from the financial risks posed by future AIDS-
related claims.232
H&H Music indicates the difficulty that most late-career plaintiffs
would have in attempting to challenge downsizing on the ground that
it was done to interfere with their pension benefits. Employers can
simply argue that in today's global economy, competition demands
that the firm cut costs whenever possible. Outsourcing, restructuring,
lean manufacturing, RIF, and other business strategies resulting in the
downsizing of late-career employees can be justified on cost contain-
ment and competitive market rationales. It is highly unlikely that
courts would interfere with the efforts of corporations seeking to re-
duce costs by eliminating employees who earn premium wages as a
result of their length of service.
Opportunistic downsizing justified on cost containment rationales
can thus provide employers with a defense to discrimination claims
brought under ERISA. Because late-career employees are likely to
have higher salary levels and benefit packages as compared to
younger employees, they will be perceived to be more "expensive"
even if they are in fact more productive as a result of possessing job-
specific training. This gives the downsizing employer a basis for claim-
ing that downsizing such employees is the result of a legitimate busi-
ness justification-late-career employees are too expensive to retain
even though they may also lose their pension benefits.
In such cases, all the courts will see is that the employer had a
reason unrelated to pension benefits for dismissing the late-career em-
ployee. ERISA, like ADEA, is therefore unlikely to deter opportu-
nistic downsizing of older workers. The fact that many late-career
employees will be over the age of forty becomes merely an unavoida-
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 407-08.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ble consequence of downsizing in the eyes of the law. Age as such is
likely to be viewed as an ancillary factor of an otherwise legitimate
business decision. What is not seen is how pension discrimination can
be justified by the cost containment rationales of downsizing.
V. Bringing Opportunistic Downsizing Within the Age and
Pension Discrimination Law
Downsizing has become a cause of great anxiety for older work-
ers who have devoted an entire lifetime of employment to a corpora-
tion or firm. Indeed, while worker loyalty to the corporation was once
rewarded with job security, today's loyal workers cannot expect to
hold on to their jobs for more than a brief period. What most workers
can expect, if they are lucky, is to work for a number of different cor-
porations during their working careers. Older workers, however, once
they have lost their jobs, are unlikely to find substantially equivalent
employment. For employees over the age of forty or fifty, downsizing
often results in permanent unemployment, or underemployment at
best.
What is needed today is an understanding of how age discrimina-
tion actually operates in non-recessionary periods when RIF and
downsizing occur. It is surprising that no one has offered an explana-
tion of the nature and consequences of age discrimination, let alone
an explanation of age discrimination in the era of RIF and downsizing.
All that has been offered to date are analytical comparisons drawn
from the analysis of race and sex discrimination. Indeed, the two
leading conservative legal scholars discussed in this Article, Posner
and Epstein, have recently offered severe criticism of ADEA on the
ground that age discrimination is unlike the "we-they" discrimination
characteristic of racism or sexism, and that older workers are not
therefore a "victim class" deserving the special protection of age dis-
crimination legislation. In so arguing, these critics have exploited a
serious weakness in the law of age discrimination.233
A. Opportunistic Downsizing and ADEA
Because ADEA arose out of the legal culture of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,234 and since the language of ADEA tracks that
of Title VII, judges look to Title VII case law in dealing with ADEA
233. See PosNER, supra note 7, at 298-363; EPSTrEIN, supra note 12, at 441-79.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). See SECRETARY OF LAIOR, NEXT STEPS IN COMBAT-
TING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1977).
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claims- 35 Thus, age issues have been analyzed by the judiciary as if
they were the same as those involving race and sex.2 36 The traditional
justification for ADEA is that age discrimination is analogous to ra-
cism and sexism. Indeed, the existing case law under ADEA has de-
veloped under the assumption that ADEA is so much like other anti-
discrimination laws that the theoretical work done under Title VII
could help to fill in the theoretical spaces in ADEA. Judges have thus
assumed that Title VII standards applicable to race and gender claims
were also relevant to age claims.
Hence, the disparate treatment theory first developed in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green 37 and the disparate impact theory of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.238 have been relied upon to resolve ADEA
claims, even though there is reason to question the applicability of
disparate treatment/impact of Title VII to ADEA. 39 In reading the
cases, one gets the impression that "[t]he ADEA edifice is today
every bit as complex and formidable as that which surrounds Title
VII." 240 And yet, as critics such as Posner and Epstein have argued,
there is little theoretical work to justify the case in favor of age dis-
crimination legislation in the first instance. If discrimination based on
age is unlike discrimination based on race and gender, then one can
question the wisdom of age discrimination as such. Both Posner and
Epstein begin their critiques of ADEA by first pointing out the differ-
ences between age discrimination and race and gender
discrimination.2 41
Epstein emphasizes that unlike discrimination on the basis of race
and sex, which defines a victim class, age and aging is something that
"binds the very persons who institute it."242 As Epstein put it:
Age restrictions are not some crude effort by one group of persons
to obtain advancement at the expense of strangers. Men will never
become women; whites will never become blacks. Racial and sexual
groups hence face some temptation to impose (especially through
235. See, e.g., Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); Loeb v. Tex-
tron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
236. See supra note 235.
237. See 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
238. See 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
239. Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Im-
pact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 267 (1995) (arguing that disparate impact theory should not be imported from Title
VII jurisprudence to the ADEA context because ADEA's purposes, history, and effects
are significantly different from those of Title VII).
240. Epsimin, supra note 12, at 443.
241. Id. at 447-48; POSNER, supra note 7, at 320.
242. EPs-rIN, supra note 12, at 447 (emphasis in original).
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legislation) costs on a group of which they will never be a part; man-
dated racial segregation was one deplorable consequence of that
tendency. But younger employees will become older employees in
the ordinary course of life, and they will be bound by the very re-
strictions that typically are implemented by senior partners in the
first place. Even in firms that start life with no old partners, it is
common to find restrictions that call for a buyout of interest at some
specified age.24
3
As we have seen,244 Posner makes a similar point in arguing that
animus age discrimination is implausible at the workplace because
"the people who do the hiring and firing are generally as old as the
people they hire and fire and are therefore unlikely to mistake those
people's vocational abilities. '245
The critics of ADEA thus premise their criticism on the apparent
distinction between age discrimination and other forms of invidious
discrimination. However, there is reason for the view that there is not
much difference between age discrimination and race or sex discrimi-
nation; and contrary to the view of critics, the similarity between age-
ism and racism and sexism is reason to enforce the original purpose of
age discrimination legislation. What binds these forms of discrimina-
tion is a systematic undervaluation by the dominant culture of work-
ers, motivated by stereotypical thinking about old people, people of
color, women, gays, lesbians, and other groups. Discrimination arises
at the workplace because older workers, people of color, women, and
gays and lesbians are not valued equally with younger, white, male,
straight workers. There are, of course, other possible reasons that
could account for the existence of stereotypes disfavoring older work-
ers, people of color, women, and gays and lesbians. In the case of
ageism at the workplace, however, it is stereotypical thinking that un-
derestimates the value of older people which underlies age discrimina-
tion in employment.246
What is needed then is an understanding of how the mechanism
of age discrimination actually affects the perception of a worker's
value in downsizing and RIF actions in non-recessionary periods. My
general claim is that opportunistic downsizing can serve to perpetuate
stereotypes about older workers which underestimate their value. To
check such behavior, ADEA must be allowed to protect late-career
employees from opportunistic layoffs, downsizing, and RIF strategies
243. Id. at 447-48.
244. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
245. POSNER, supra note 7, at 321.
246. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 322 (citing ERDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM: NEGA-
TIVE AND PosMnvE 5 (1990)).
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which are implemented for the purpose of eliminating aging late-ca-
reer workers because they are too expensive.
If the employer seeks to target aging late-career workers for
downsizing, then the courts should be suspicious of the employer's de-
cision. If the employer attempts to justify its decision on the grounds
that aging late-career workers are too expensive, then there is reason
to support an inference of age discrimination based on the theory of
opportunistic downsizing. In such cases it is more probable than not
that the age of the worker is the real reason for the decision.
Because of the close nexus between age and length of service
(most late-career employees will be over the age of forty), a court
would be justified in finding that the employer's decision to target
late-career workers for downsizing was a decision based on the age of
the employees. Because ADEA is a motive-based statute, and be-
cause disparate treatment rather than disparate impact analysis is fa-
vored in ADEA cases, courts require plaintiffs to prove they were
fired because of their age. This leads ADEA plaintiffs to interpret the
Supreme Court's decision in Biggins in accordance with the way
Schwab has read the Biggins decision.247 As Schwab explained: "In
[Biggins] the Supreme Court did not preclude the possibility that
ADEA protects workers from an employer who fires workers with a
certain pension status as a 'proxy' for age, in the sense that the em-
ployer may suppose a correlation between the two factors and act on
the basis of pension status to get at age. ''24s
Because the unique nature of downsizing and RIF does not entail
the hiring of replacement workers, a modified formulation of the
prima facie case is warranted. The prima facie case for ADEA claims
in RIF and downsizing cases should be modified to require the plain-
tiff to prove that: 1) he or she is forty years old or older (and hence a
member of the protected class); 2) he or she was terminated pursuant
to a RIF or downsizing decision; 3) he or she is a late-career employee
with firm-specific skills; and 4) he or she was permanently laid-off for
being too expensive or costly to the firm.249
247. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text. Discrimination based on salary
as evidence of age discrimination would require the courts to interpret the Supreme
Court's decision in Biggins as not precluding plaintiffs from using salary as circumstantial
evidence of age discrimination.
248. Schwab, supra note 3, at 45.
249. This reformulation of the prima facie case is different from the one recently of-
fered by Jessica Lind. See Lind, supra note 105, at 845. Lind's formulation requires that
the plaintiff's job duties be reassigned to a younger employee less qualified than the plain-
tiff. Id. However, because employers sometimes replace older workers with other older
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In establishing the prima facie case that the employer acted with
the requisite intent to discriminate, the plaintiff should be allowed to
rely on circumstantial evidence such as salary and pension status as a
"proxy" for proving that age was a motivating factor in the employer's
decision. This would necessitate that courts choose Schwab's interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court's decision in Biggins. ADEA should be
construed to protect older late-career workers who are fired because
their salary exceeds current productivity.
Employers would still be free to rebut the prima facie case by
showing that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dis-
placing the late-career employee. 250 The burden shifts to the em-
ployer because the employer is in the best position to explain the
reasons for its actions.25' The employer might successfully defend
against the prima facie case by showing that its cost containment ra-
tionale for downsizing was based on age-neutral considerations which
were independent of the salary status of older workers. Technological
restructuring, or the elimination of jobs as a result of new technology,
reduced market demand for the company's product, and outsourcing
and lean manufacturing strategies that do not target older workers by
workers, Lind's test could be evaded by employers practicing "cashiering." Moreover,
what is critical to the theory of opportunistic discharge is whether the plaintiff has a sunk
cost investment in a long-term relationship. Thus, the focus of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case should be on whether the plaintiff is a late-career employee with job-
specific training. This prima facie test could find support in a number of federal court
decisions, following the Williams approach. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656
F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Earley v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-84 (11th Cir. 1990); Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d
93, 95-97 (7th Cir. 1985); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 663, 641-
45 (5th Cir. 1985). Jessica Lind argues that courts which follow the Williams approach
require the plaintiff to offer "pretext evidence" to establish the prima facie case. Lind,
supra note 105, at 844. Lind argues that the "Williams approach ignores the fact that in
structuring the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Supreme Court limited consideration
of pretextual evidence to the third stage of analysis, after the plaintiff already has estab-
lished a prima facie case." Id. at 845 (emphasis in original). Lind, however, ignores the
possibility that plaintiffs may offer evidence of salary as a "proxy" for age in establishing
their prima facie case. Employers who assess the costs of employing an older worker when
deciding to downsize aging workers are using salary as a "proxy" rather than as a "pretext"
in terminating the older worker. The Supreme Court in Biggins interpreted the word
"proxy" to mean statutory equivalent of age. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 613 (1993) (citing Metz, 828 F.2d at 1208). See also Schwab, supra note 3, at 45 n.148.
250. The prima facie case, once established, gives rise to a presumption of age discrimi-
nation; the burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence rebutting the presump-
tion of discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254
(1981).
251. See Clara B. Bums, Comment, The Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in
Reduction-in-Force Layoffs: A Flexible Standard, 20 TEx. TscH. L. REv. 841, 857 (1989).
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using their salary as a proxy for determining termination, may be le-
gitimate justifications sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of age
discrimination. The courts might also recognize a business justifica-
tion defense based on financial necessity; for instance, when it would
be necessary for the firm to avoid bankruptcy.
The ADEA plaintiff would then have an opportunity in the third
stage of the litigation to demonstrate that the employer's proffered
business justification was a mere pretext or that there is a reasonable
alternative that would not result in layoffs. 52 At this stage, the plain-
tiff could attack the employer's assertion of cost containment justifica-
tion for its decision by offering other evidence evincing pretext on the
part of the employer.253 Examples of "pretext evidence" might in-
clude a demonstration that the employer engaged in "two-stage" RIF
or resorted to "cashiering" in order to cover its true unlawful motive.
Arguably, a showing that the employer was motivated by a discrimina-
tory motive rather than the nondiscriminatory motive raised in its de-
fense of the case, would be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate
burden of proof.
B. Opportunistic Downsizing under ERISA
Under ERISA,254 a late-career employee whose job is threatened
by downsizing should be allowed to allege and prove that downsizing
was motivated by an intent to discriminate to prevent the future exer-
cise of rights under a pension plan covered by ERISA. Section 510 of
ERISA ostensibly prohibits this form of discrimination in order to
protect employees from losing pension benefits protected under fed-
eral pension law. To render section 510 more responsive to opportu-
nistic forms of pension discrimination, the courts should be more
critical of the proffered cost containment rationales utilized by em-
ployers to terminate the jobs of employees nearing retirement.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Biggins, an inference of pen-
sion discrimination is warranted whenever an employer fires an aging
employee nearing retirement and the vesting of his or her pension.
Downsized employees should be allowed to seek remedies under sec-
252. After the employer rebuts the prima facie case, the burden shifts again to plaintiff
to prove that employer's proffered reason was not the true reason for its actions. See Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). This is the third and
final stage of the litigation.
253. Disproving the employer's proffered reason does not entitle the plaintiff to a judg-
ment as a matter of law. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
254. Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 11,
12, 15, 18, 22, 26, 29, 31, 42, and 45 U.S.C.).
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tion 510 by showing that the employer chose to downsize their jobs in
order to avoid incurring expensive pension benefits that were about to
vest. Cost containment rationales therefore should not be allowed to
immunize these claims from ERISA regulation.
The fact that an employer argues that the business will save
money by getting rid of a late-career employee who is nearing retire-
ment is itself sufficient to raise a presumption that the employer was
motivated by a desire to avoid paying employee pension benefits. The
cost containment rationale in such a case would be probative of the
employer's intent. Whether such evidence would provide a sufficient
basis to state a cognizable claim under section 510 of ERISA would
depend on whether the employee could prove that he or she was fired
in order to prevent his or her pension benefits from vesting. If, for
example, the plaintiff could show that the alleged savings were insub-
stantial or alternative cost containment strategies were available and
not considered, then the employer's decision to downsize would war-
rant a presumption that it was done with the intent to discriminate in
violation of section 510 of ERISA.
Conclusion
In bringing opportunistic behavior within the reach of age and
pension discrimination legislation, the courts would necessarily limit
the heretofore carte blanche power of firms to downsize. The propo-
sal for reformulating the current structure of discrimination litigation
is intended, however, to place a check only against opportunistic
downsizing. To ignore this business practice is to render the anti-dis-
crimination provisions of laws like ADEA and ERISA meaningless in
the current downsizing era.
The critics of the current anti-discrimination regime established
under ADEA and, by implication, ERISA, however, have been quite
persuasive in questioning the wisdom of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. In this Article, I have attempted to respond to their criticism by
arguing the case for reformulating the law of age and pension discrim-
ination so that it might better respond to the way age and pension
discrimination is practiced today in the current downsizing era.
I recognize that there appears to be a growing consensus that the
anti-discrimination principle should be discarded in favor of older
norms of laissez-faire and free market. The conservative political cli-
mate has undoubtedly served to bolster those who want to now repeal
federal anti-discrimination legislation. But, before we dismantle the
comprehensive anti-discrimination schemes Congress has labored so
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hard over the years to erect, we should first try to understand how
discrimination may or may not be operating today.
The premise of this Article is that a form of age and pension dis-
crimination has gone largely unregulated under existing federal anti-
discrimination legislation. Aging workers have been exposed to
otherwise illegal age and pension discrimination as employers down-
size and restructure their jobs in order to save the costs of paying their
salary and pension benefits. This illegal form of discrimination, which
I have called "opportunistic downsizing," ought to be prohibited by
the anti-discrimination provisions of ADEA and ERISA. However,
because courts and commentators have assumed that cost contain-
ment rationales absolutely insulate employer decisions and actions
from the anti-discrimination principles of such laws, opportunistic
downsizing has gone largely unregulated and unchallenged in the
courts.
Some may object on the grounds that an expansion of ADEA
and ERISA to cover problems of opportunistic downsizing would pro-
mote more costly litigation in the courts. An argument can be made
that the anti-discrimination laws should be narrowly construed in or-
der to protect otherwise innocent employers from being swamped
with the cost of defending expensive, non-frivolous, but marginal fed-
eral discrimination litigation brought under ADEA and ERISA.
Judges have a duty to minimize the cost of litigation and to protect
employers from frivolous litigation. Of course, the marginality of
otherwise meritorious litigation should not deter the courts from their
duty to enforce the law. Moreover, it is far from clear that litigation
costs justify an explicit judicial policy of under-enforcement.
For the sake of argument, assume that a judicial policy of reduced
enforcement of ADEA and ERISA saves employers money that
would have to be spent on defending suits, which would otherwise not
be screened out by normal court supervision.255 This cost savings in
litigation expense would not, in and of itself, be dispositive of the
question of whether to bring claims of opportunistic downsizing within
ADEA or ERISA. The reason is that there would be other external
"costs" incurred.
Consider, for example, federal policy affected by the premature
retirement of older downsized workers. If opportunistic downsizing
goes unchecked, we can expect to see more older workers forced to
retire prematurely. It would encourage more downsizing of older
255. For example, by invoking Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
workers who are still productive. This means that there will be more
workers going into retirement and therefore greater resources will be
consumed in providing for the new generation of retired workers. As
life expectancy expands and the current baby boom generation ages,
more of the country's income must be devoted to the needs of
retirees.
Workers who have savings and other private sources of retire-
ment funds will be able to take care of themselves upon retirement,
but for the vast majority of workers, Social Security will be their only
source of retirement income. Social Security is in fact the largest part
of the income of America's elderly.256 By the year 2000, there will be
twenty-one older persons for every 100 persons between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-four. 5 7 There is thus a strong likelihood that there
will be a substantial drain on the Social Security system by the end of
this century. Indeed, the trustees of the Social Security system have
already estimated that revenues will fall short of the scheduled outlays
by about thirty percent between 2019 and 2043.258 We are thus facing
a serious Social Security crisis.259
There are few options available to resolve this crisis. One solu-
tion would be to raise taxes to make up for the shortfall in Social
Security revenues. Higher taxes do not seem to be a viable political
option in the current political environment. Cutting benefits or soak-
ing the rich might be a second best interim solution, but these stop-
gap measures are unlikely to be sufficient to keep the Social Security
fund in the black during the next century. Increased savings would be
another alternative, but Americans have not shown a willingness to
increase their private savings for retirement. The only real alternative
which might help to solve the pending crisis may be to keep workers
in jobs for additional years in order to ease the retirement squeeze on
Social Security. Downsizing of late-career employees, however, has
had just the opposite effect-workers who are just entering the prime
of their working careers are downsized and rendered either unem-
ployed at a younger than expected age-early fifties or sixties instead
256. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1186 (3d ed. 1996).
257. U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND
PROSPECTS 45 (1981), cited in ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 256, at 1187, 1188.
258. See Peter Passel, You Saved But They Didn't. So Now What? Cracking the Baby
Boom Nest Egg, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1996, § 3, at 1.
259. See PETER G. PETERSON, WILL AMERICA GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD?
How THE COMING SOCIAL SECURITY CRISIS THREATENS YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND YOUR
CouNTRY 1 (1996).
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of sixty-five or over-or underemployed in contingent employment
arrangements without employment security.
Of course, a sixty-five year old downsized executive who cannot
afford to live on Social Security alone might well decide that he or she
has to remain employed. Many retired older workers may decide to
return to work after being retired because they are unable to live on
Social Security and savings. In returning to the work force, many of
these "second career" employees compete with the recently down-
sized worker for low paying jobs, mainly in the service industry (the
proverbial "hamburger flipping" industry). As more workers are
downsized, they will be forced to accept jobs that pay less and offer
fewer retirement benefits. We can also expect that many more older
people will eventually be forced into premature "poverty" retirement
mainly because there will be few reasonably good jobs available to
them.
Opportunistic downsizing, if it is allowed to go unchecked, will
only exacerbate the coming Social Security crisis. By increasing the
number of contingent workers, downsizing will create a greater drain
on the Social Security system and will therefore contribute to the in-
adequate funding of the Social Security system. Delaying retirement
and voluntary savings are currently the best means for avoiding the
bankruptcy of the Social Security system. Downsizing makes these
options even less likely, as more older downsized workers can no
longer find gainful permanent employment. One way or another, the
Social Security crisis must be addressed or the next generation of re-
tirees will have to do without.
There is yet another "social cost" that will be incurred if opportu-
nistic downsizing goes unregulated in the courts. As a result of oppor-
tunistic downsizing, aging workers can no longer expect to receive the
rewards of hard work from a lifetime of devotion to a single employer.
Job security based on efficient, long-term service is something that
employees can no longer count on in the era of downsizing. Indeed,
the more common experience today is that most workers can expect
to be fired at least once during their employment career. The pending
threat of being fired, especially when it occurs late in the employee's
career with a particular employer, can have a serious negative impact
on other workers even if the downsized worker can find another job
after being downsized. The threat of dismissal late in life can thus
affect the way all workers think about their jobs. An employee who
believes that he or she will be fired at some point may be less likely to
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work as hard as an employee who believes that the job will remain
secure so long as he or she works hard and is a "good employee."
As Schwab has noted, the reason for late-vesting pension benefits
and seniority-based wages is to tell workers: "if you stick around, you
will do well. '260 If employees come to believe that it is just a matter of
time before they too will be downsized because they have become too
expensive, then they may decide that it just doesn't pay to work hard.
Some employees may "shirk" on the job, working at a reduced level if
they believe they may be downsized as they grow older. Downsizing
of aging workers can therefore initiate a form of defensive opportunis-
tic behavior practiced by employees who will no longer have an incen-
tive to work hard during the beginning and middle periods of their job
careers.
261
Because perfunctory performance is difficult for employers to
monitor, employee shirking may be a serious cost of downsizing. Em-
ployee shirking is likely to be exacerbated if employees have reason to
believe that their employer practices opportunistic downsizing.
When an employee is downsized for economic reasons, the em-
ployee's job security is not within the control of the employer. If a
late-career older worker is opportunistically downsized, however, the
employee's job security is within the control of the employer. If other
workers see that the employer is targeting older workers for downsiz-
ing, then they will come to question the wisdom of working hard and
investing in their own job training. Why invest in job-specific training
if the job will be terminated once one becomes trained and has
reached a wage scale that compensates for the cost of such training?
Why work hard during early periods of employment when wages are
likely to be low, if one will be downsized later when wages are high,
especially when job-specific skills are not transferable to another em-
ployer? In order to minimize their own costs, employees who fear
opportunistic downsizing may be less willing to be efficient on the job
since the cost of working hard would not likely be rewarded with
higher wages and benefits as they age on the job. While an employer's
reputation for engaging in opportunistic downsizing may not deter fu-
ture employees from seeking jobs with the employer when downsizing
260. Schwab, supra note 3, at 21.
261. Employee opportunism in long-term employment relations is greatest during mid-
career because this is when employee shirking is likely to be the greatest. See Schwab,
supra note 3, at 47-51. This is "[b]ecause the employer does not want to repeat recruiting
and training costs with another employee, the incumbent [mid-career] employee has an
opportunity to shirk without fear of dismissal." Id. at 47.
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occurs,262 a bad reputation for downsizing may discourage active
workers from working as hard as they would if they believed that they
would be treated fairly as they age.
Studies suggest that exposure to opportunistic downsizing in fact
jeopardized the psychological well-being of workers, including their
attitude towards work.263 Because unemployment can be hazardous
to the workers' emotional health, the threat of being downsized on
account of age and late-career employment can have negative conse-
quences on the productivity of otherwise productive workers.264 Stud-
ies of managers in firms that have experienced layoffs suggest that the
"survivors" suffer psychologically.265 "Many managers reported that
layoffs have a decidedly negative effect on subordinates' productivity,
morale and commitment to the organization. '266
The threat of downsizing can also affect the degree to which
workers will be willing to invest in their own job training. "Human
capital theory predicts that workers' expected investment horizons are
important determinants of the probability of receiving training. '267
While this is likely to be the case with general downsizing, the adverse
effect on job training will be heightened if career employees are
threatened with opportunistic downsizing. Workers who have de-
voted a lifetime of service to their employers should not be fired pre-
maturely at the end of their careers even if they are paid a wage which
may exceed their current productivity. The wage of a late-career em-
ployee accounts for more than just that employee's current level of
productivity; it also covers the employee's investment in the job mea-
sured in terms of years of service. To allow employers to downsize
aging late-career employees who are nearing retirement sends a
message to all workers that hard work and loyal service is not likely to
be valued at the workplace. Workers will have less reason to adhere
to the work ethic which has heretofore sustained America's standard
of living.
262. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
263. See William Darity, Jr. & Arthur H. Goldsmith, Social Psychology, Unemploy-
ment and Macroeconomics, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECrIVES 121, 121-22 (1996).
264. Id. at 124.
265. Id. at 124 (citing Joel Brockner, Managing the Effects of Layoffs on Survivors, 34
CAL. MGm-r. REv. 9 (1992); Joel Brockner, The Effects of Work Layoffs on Survivors: Re-
search, Theory, and Practice, in RESEARC H IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 213-55 (Barry
M. Staw & L. L. Cummings eds., 1988)).
266. Id.
267. Royalty, supra note 216, at 520. Royalty's study of data from the national Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth supports such a prediction. Id.
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It is preferable, all things considered, to opt for incurring the in-
creased costs of litigating opportunistic downsizing disputes in order
to provide a more effective enforcement of the anti-discrimination
principle embedded within the federal age and pension discrimination
laws, since those principles are critical to maintaining a healthy and
productive work ethic. It is bad legal and social policy to argue that
the anti-discrimination provisions of federal age and pension law
should be disregarded, minimized, or "judicially downsized." Because
aging late-career employees are prime targets for opportunistic down-
sizing, and because the employer will have an economic incentive to
target them for downsizing on the basis of their age and pension sta-
tus, the courts should become more, not less, involved in the business
of enforcing age and pension anti-discrimination in employment
legislation.
